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ABSTRACT
Many argue that the American educational system is under siege.
Students bring with them to school an array of social problems never before
seen in this country. Illegal drugs, raging violence, brutal crime, abject poverty,
and hopeless desolation pervade our children’s lives. Loaded firearms, deadly
weapons, and lethal substances are confiscated daily in urban, suburban, and
rural schools. Administrators are shot, teachers are mugged, students are
stabbed. Schools are in crisis; the war rages. How do school administrators
cope?
This investigation concerns the interrelationships, definitions, and
applications of several phenomena; war, education, administration, leadership,
and power. Through the experiences of the researcher as a fighter-bomber
pilot with the 22nd Bomb Squadron,1 the Flying Tigers, during World War II
and as an educator for nearly fifty years, comparisons between these two
principle environments will be made in light of the phenomena under study.
The present study, then, is an historical case study of the development of
the Flying Tigers in relation to educational administration and leadership in the

1 In text, the 22nd Bomb Squadron and The Flying Tigers will be used
somewhat interchangeably.
iii

current school environment. Historical research was used for detail concerning
the development of the squadron and its experiences during World War II.
Literature on situational leadership in and outside education was examined in
relationship to the experiences of the researcher as a fighter-bomber pilot
during the war and as an educator for fifty years.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... iii
LIST O F T A B L E S................................................................................................. viii
DEDICATION ........................................................................................................ ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... x
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................1
B ackground....................................................................................................... 2
The P ro b le m ..................................................................................................... 4
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND
M ETH ODOLOG Y...................................................... 6
The Nature of the Historical Problem .........................................................7
The Nature of the Leadership Problem ...................................................... 8
D efinitions..........................................................................................................9
Leadership ............................................................................................9
O rganization........................................................................................11
Administration ...................................................................................13
Acronyms ............................................................................................ 15
Literature on L e a d ersh ip .............................................................................. 15
M ethodology................................................................................................... 18
Observational R ese arch .................................................................... 20

v

CHAPTER 3
TH E HISTORY OF THE FLYIN G T IG E R S ................ 21
Introduction..................................................................................................... 22
An Overview of the United States Army during World War I I
23
An Overview of Aviation History Prior to World War I I ........................23
The Problem of Organization and Leadership in the Air Service . . . . 26
The Need for Air Power during World War I I ......................................32
The International Perspective on Air Power Before World War II . . 33
The United States Responds to World Aggression
by Building Air Defense ................................................................34
Preparation by the United States for World War II ............................ 35
The Development of Air D o c trin e ............................................................. 36
The Fight for Air Force Autonomy ........................................................... 37
The Birth of the 22nd Bomb Squadron...................................................... 41
The 22nd Bomb Squadron at the Beginning of World War I I
41
The Rebirth of the 22nd Bomb Squadron, Bombing Eagles, in 1942 . . 42
The Problem of Leadership in the CBI T h e a te r ....................................46
The Tenth Air F o r c e .................................................................................. 48
Conflict Within the Tenth Air Force ...................................................... 49
The 22nd Bomb Squadron during 1943 .................................................... 55
The Fourteenth Air Force, Bombing Bulldogs,
during 1944 in Yangkai, C h in a .........................................................55
The End of World War II ........................................................................... 59
The Death of President R o o se v e lt............................................................. 60
The War Winds D o w n .................................................................................. 61
The 22nd Bomb Squadron C h a n g e s ........................................................... 62
The War in Asia E n d s ................................................................................ 64
TH E IMPORTANCE OF THE FLYING TIGERS TO
TH E SUCCESS OF TH E UNITED STATES
IN WORLD WAR II ............................................... 65
The 341st Bomb Group, 69th Composite Wing,
Fourteenth Air Force, the FlyingTigers ..........................................65
Squadron R e lo c a tio n .................................................................................. 67
Administrative and Leadership Mode of the Flying Tigers ................... 69
Management of the 11th BombSquadron ..................................... 69
69th Composite Wing .................................................................................. 73
Fourteenth Air Force, the Flying Tigers.................................................... 74
Background......................................................................................... 74
The Arrival of the Fourteenth Air F o r c e ......................................75
May 1945 ........................................................................................... 82
June 1945 ........................................................................................... 84
Major F. M. Sibley....................................................................................... 85

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5

A COMPARISON OF THE MANAGEMENT AND
LEADERSHIP OF THE FLYING TIGERS
AND ED U C A T IO N ..................................................87
Purpose of the S tu d y .....................................................................................87
The Application of This Research to Current E du catio n ........................89
Implications of the Research .......................................................................92
Leadership ......................................................................................... 92
Administration vs. L e a d e rsh ip .........................................................93
Implications for Future R e s e a rc h ................................................................97
Conclusion....................................................................................................... 98

A PPE N D IC E S.......................................................................................................... 102
Appendix A Photocopies of Airplanes in C o m b a t..................................102
Appendix B Maps of the CBI T h e a te r .....................................................105
Appendix C Organizational Chart and Tactical Unit H isto ry
109
Appendix D Insignia of the Bombing E a g le s........................................... 115
Appendix E Award of Chinese Wings for Service in World War II . 117
Appendix F Photocopy of General C hennault.........................................122
Appendix G Insignia of the Bombing Bulldogs......................................... 125
Appendix H Diagrams of B-25s and A -2 6 s ..............................................130
Appendix I Distinguished Unit Citation .................................................. 136
Appendix J Insignias of the Fourteenth Air Force
and the Flying Tigers ....................................................................... 138
Appendix K Foreword from the History of the 22nd Bomb Squadron,
the Flying Tigers.................................................................................142
B IB L IO G R A P H Y ................................................................................................... 146
S e co n d a ry ......................................................................................................146
P rim a ry .......................................................................................................... 150

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1

Aviation Time L i n e .............................................................................27

Table 2

Development of United States Air Doctrine 1917 -1941 . . . . 37

Table 3

Summary of the History of the 341st Bomb G r o u p ...................... 72

Table 4

Summary of the History of the 69th Composite W in g ..................74

viii

DEDICATION
In memory o f
my mother Della Larson Schofield
and
my father Thomas Theron Schofield
and
my roommates in Yangkai, China
who sacrificed their lives
in mortal combat for the tenet o f freedom
Lieutenant Yale A. Ketchum
Captain Joseph Wirth
and
my friend and buddy Captain Edward B. Waite

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is a product of my passion for my experience as a
bomber pilot in the 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers, during World War
II and of my dedication to the memories of those who forfeited their lives
fighting for democracy. Passion was not sufficient to produce this work,
however, and I want to thank all those who helped me in this effort.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Professor Carl Steinhoff, who chaired
the dissertation committee, and Professor Lloyd Bishop urged and encouraged
me to complete this history. Without their guidance, support, and care, I might
not have finished. Professor Anthony Saville, School of Education, and
Professor Jay Coughtry, Department of History, served well as committee
members and additional mentors. Dr. Coughtry, in particular, far exceeded his
responsibilities in reviewing the rough drafts with patience and understanding
in spite of his own physical pain.
Amy Lawson was my first typist. A student at Southern Nevada
Vocational Technical Center where I teach, Amy continued to assist me even
after her graduation. Joyce Standish, my second typist, was the original editor,

x

friend, supporter, and confidante who constructed the first several drafts of this
document.
All of the librarians were kind, patient, and understanding both at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas Library-Dan Chacchia, Sheila Beard, Maria
White, Jackie Brantley, and Marji Zimmerman--and the Maxwell Air Force
Base Historical Research Center and Air University Library—Melinda Mosley,
Joan Hyatt, Diana Simpson, Tomma Pastorett, Mickey Russell, SRA Lucinda
Gizinski, Janet Giuhan, Richard Gamma, Major Rony Owen, Archie Pifante,
Joseph Carver, Essie Roberts, Sandi Smith.
On the home front, my wife of 53 years, Alene Earl, has been my closest
friend, most respected colleague, ever-present companion, and wonderful
mother to our children. An avid, voracious reader, Alene has the keenest
perception and intuition of anyone I have ever known.
My thanks for their patience and support also extend to my six beautiful,
wonderful children and their cooperative spouses-Camille and Don Farmer,
Pamela and Ron Bananto, Jacqueline and Mark Taylor, Jill and Frank
Mauriello, Jack, Jr. and Jan Borum Schofield, and Christopher. Their children,
too, 29 in all, have accepted that dad, bapa, and greatbapa had to study and did
not have time to play for quite some time.
I have dedicated this work to my loving, caring mother, Della Larson
Schofield, who left me an unmatchable legacy, and to my father, Thomas
Theron Schofield, who was an outstanding teacher of real life in spite of his

eccentricities. In addition, I hope I have honored with this work those who
died and those who lived and became a part of my extended military family,
the members of the 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Many argue that the American educational system is under siege.
Students bring with them to school an array of social problems never before
seen in this country. Illegal drugs, raging violence, brutal crime, abject poverty,
and hopeless desolation pervade our children’s lives. Loaded firearms, deadly
weapons, and lethal substances are confiscated daily in urban, suburban, and
rural schools. Administrators are shot, teachers are mugged, students are
stabbed. Schools are in crisis; the war rages. How do school administrators
cope?
This investigation concerns the interrelationships, definitions, and
applications of several phenomena: war, education, administration, leadership,
and power. Through the experiences of the researcher as a fighter-bomber
pilot with the 22nd Bomb Squadron,1 the Flying Tigers, during World War II
and as an educator for nearly fifty years, comparisons between these two
principle environments will be made in light of the phenomena under study.

1 In text, the 22nd Bomb Squadron and The Flying Tigers will be used
somewhat interchangeably.
1

Background
Public education in the United States predates the establishment of this
country. As early as 1685,2 laws were proposed requiring towns to provide
schools, political leaders to select teachers, and children to attend school for at
least seven years. Both boys and girls were included, although educated
separately, and children of the Indians [sic] and of the poor were invited to
attend as well. Curriculum was practical and involved reading, writing, and
arithmetic for all children as well as manual trades for boys and domestic
training for girls.
Over time, United States public schools have become a model for
educating the masses for living in a democracy. The American system is based
on the presumption that an enlightened citizenry is a requirement of a free,
truly representative society.3
The cultivation of free men for a free society was an ethic that took into
account both the humanistic belief in the inalienable right of man to
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the instrumental use of
education to provide for the intelligent and responsible leadership that
was necessary to ensure such a free society.4

2 John Hardin Best and Robert T. Sidwell, eds., The American Legacy of
Learning: Readings in the History of Education (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott
Company, 1967), 56.
3 Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York:
G. P. Putnam, 1904), 60-65.
4 Best and Sidwell, 90.
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The United States educational system, therefore, in some sense was established
to create leadership for our countiy. Throughout American histoiy this fact has
been demonstrated both politically and militarily.
The stability of schools as an institution has reinforced its role as an
instrument of social change. As a public system, it is capable of far-reaching
change unlike any other establishment or resource in this country.
Like all simple and unsophisticated peoples we Americans have a
sublime faith in education. Faced with any difficult problem of life we
set our minds at rest sooner or later by the appeal to the school. We
are convinced that education is the one unfailing remedy for every ill to
which man is subject, whether it be vice, crime, war, poverty, riches,
injustice, racketeering, political corruption, race hatred, class conflict, or
just plain original sin. We even speak glibly and often about the general
reconstruction of society through the school. We cling to this faith in
spite of the fact that the veiy period in which our troubles have
multiplied so rapidly has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of
organized education. This would seem to suggest that our schools,
instead of directing the course of change, are themselves driven by the
very forces that are transforming the rest of the social order.5
Within the past decade, however, in addition to curing the ills of society
bevond the walls of the school, the school is expected to solve the world’s
problems since they have now arrived in the school.

5 George S. Counts, Dare the School Build a New Social Order? (New
York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1932), 3-4.

The Problem
A comparison can be made between war, defined as an

. . armed

conflict between nations, tribes or other groups . . . a concerted effort to put
down, reduce or exterminate . . . a state of hostility without resort to arms,"6
and the current environment of public education. Even educators see
themselves as warriors. For example, in reporting about Ruben Perez, an
Assistant Principal in Denver who was publicly berated for suspending a slew
of children from Horace Mann Middle School for chronic disruptive behavior,
journalist David Hill noted,
As I left his office, I realized that Ruben Perez sees himself as a man
fighting a war of his own-not just a war against disruptive students but
also a war against the bureaucrats who won’t let him do his job the way
he sees fit. And just like Patton, he has no intention of giving in to his
critics.7
As education-bashers will clearly state, war extends into the school districts
between children and parents, children and teachers, parents and teachers,
parents and administrators, parents and school boards, teachers and
administrators, administrators and school boards, and so on.
During World War II, this researcher, who later became an educator,
was a fighter-bomber pilot as a member of the Flying Tigers. Drawing on

6 The New Lexicon Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English
Language. Deluxe Edition (New York: Lexicon Publications, Inc., 1989), 1109.
7 David Hill, "The Disciplinarian," Education Week. 29 March 1995, 24.

observations and historical investigation, the following research questions were
posed:
1.

How did the Flying Tigers come to be?

2.

What was the importance of the Flying Tigers to the success of the
United States in World War II?

3.

What was the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying
Tigers'1

4.

a.

Was the mode appropriate for the military?

b.

Was the mode appropriate for the time?

How does wartime combat compare to the educational
environment today?

5.

How does the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying
Tigers apply to today’s educational scene?

These questions will be answered primarily through examining the history of
the establishment and the action of the Flying Tigers and then comparing that
information with current educational administrative and leadership practice as
evidenced both by the literature and by the experience of the researcher.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY
During World War II, this researcher, who later became an educator,
was a fighter-bomber pilot as a member of the Flying Tigers. Drawing on
observations and historical investigation, the following research questions were
posed:
1.

How did the Flying Tigers come to be?

2.

What was the importance of the Flying Tigers to the success of the
United States in World War II?

3.

What was the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying
Tigers1

4.

a.

Was the mode appropriate for the military?

b.

Was the mode appropriate for the time?

How does wartime combat compare to the educational
environment today?

5.

How does the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying
Tigers apply to today’s educational scene?

6

The Nature of the Historical Problem
Time is running out for recounting their history for those who served in
the military during World War II between 1941 - 1945. They are significant
primary living resources who can assist in validating the concepts of leadership,
organization, and administration that are addressed in this study. The research
questions posed here are verifiable by those who were a part of the 22nd Bomb
Squadron, the Flying Tigers, and, for the most part, many participants are still
able to remember their experiences even to the minutest detail. Many were
contacted and eagerly shared their experiences.
The history of the 22nd Bomb Squadron unfortunately remains
unwritten. Documentation is critical, however, for those who lived through
both the happy times and the horror. In some cases, combat crews witnessed
anti-aircraft, machine gun, and enemy aircraft fire, or they flew through the
jaws o f hell. Silenced for fifty years by memories of the atrocities of war,
survivors now feel compelled to recount their experiences as their mortality
faces them in the mirror each day.
As important as this history is for the participants of the Flying Tigers, it
is also crucial for their families and all those who loved them. They, too, paid
the supreme sacrifice donating the lives of those they loved to the cause of
freedom. They know that their young men, in many cases, fell to the ground in
balls of flames and their remains are now a part of the dust of China, India, or
Burma. Equally critical, almost every member of the 22nd Bomb Squadron
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had a roommate, friend, or acquaintance who was killed either in combat or by
accident while serving in the squadron. This story honors love, friendship, and
memories.
For purposes of research, the story of the Flying Tigers needs to be told
in another perspective. By analyzing the administration, leadership, and
organization of the 22nd Bomb Squadron in relationship to the current war on
the educational battlefield, situational leadership can be examined. Some
lessons that were learned may be useful in buttressing the principles and the
qualities of these three phenomena. The situational leadership styles used
need to be noted, scrutinized, evaluated, analyzed, and carefully recorded in
order to apply these qualities in future leadership training. The same careful
consideration needs to be done with the organizational concepts and the skills,
techniques, and practices of administration.

The Nature of the Leadership Problem
All members of the 22nd Bomb Squadron displayed loyalty to the
United States in several ways. First, they willingly accepted the call to arms in
World War II. Second, they obeyed without question orders that sent them
15,000 miles from their homes and families. Every member of the 22nd Bomb
Squadron also demonstrated leadership in a variety of ways. Therefore, both
the leadership and administrative practices of the Flying Tigers during World
War II have been described as well as both the ideal and catastrophic

administration. In addition, organizational structure has been explained and
depicted.

Definitions
The definitions have been divided into four subsections: leadership,
organization, administration, and acronyms.
Leadership
Leadership can be defined as the position or functions of a leader who
has the ability and talent to lead by giving guidance and direction to groups
such as an army or movement or political association. It includes the direction,
supervision, or management of a group or an organization. Further, leadership
is "the process of influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts
toward goal achievement in a given situation."1 [Emphasis added.]
Leaders are ubiquitous. They may be emergent--that is, informally
acknowledged, elected by the group, or appointed by the organization of which
the group is a part, as is the case in the military. A leader, by definition, may
thus be a gas station manager, a chief executive officer (CEO) of a
multinational company, or a person who happens to be the most influential in a
group.

1 Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational
Behavior. Sixth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993), 94.

10
Most of the original leaders of the Flying Tigers could be considered
emergent because they were selected on the basis of prior achievement.
Emergent leaders are usually identified by asking such questions as "Whose
opinion do you value most in this group?" or "Whom would you most like to
have as your leader?" In addition, they tend to be slightly more intelligent,
somewhat larger, and more visible and socially adept than other group
members. The group members perceive that the emergent leader is able to
provide the needed skills and/or economic or political resources to help the
group achieve its goals.
Leadership, for the purposes of this study, included policies that were
formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), the Fourteenth Air Force,
69th Composite Wing, 341st Bomb Group, and 22nd Bomb Squadron, with the
authority to establish rules and regulations. The Combined Chiefs o f S taff
established the overall direction and objective for World War II after Prime
Minister Winston Churchill, along with his military chiefs of staff committee
and supported by both the British Joint Plans Committee and Joint Intelligence
Committee, consulted with President Franklin Roosevelt on the combined
grand strategy. President Roosevelt then appointed the U.S. Joint Chiefs of
Staff Committee that included General Henry "Hap" Arnold, Army Air Forces
(AAF) chief, on the initiative of General George Marshall.2

2 Haywood S. Hansel Jr., The Strategic Air War Against Germany and
Japan: A Memoir (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, USAF,
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Leadership policy was determined by the Air War Plans Division under
the president’s directive. The Air War Plans Division (AW PD/1) was a newly
created agency within the Air Staff on 11 September 1941. The leadership
policy document clearly explained the leadership direction of air power and
strategies that would be followed in any future conflicts using tactical and
strategic weapons and their uses to defeat the enemy. The AWPD/1 policy
statement, the primary leadership policy document, called for 10 groups of
medium bombers specifically composed of B-25 and B-26 models and explained
how they would be used.3 (See Appendix A, Photocopies of Airplanes in
Combat)
One could argue that almost everyone is a leader of at least some
groups and a follower in innumerable others. Personality is not enough,
however, and recent studies support the notion of training as necessary for
grooming leaders as the military has always done. A particular trait would not
necessarily identify a leader.4
Organization
An organization is a rational, legitimate, and ideally dynamic relationship
of people, coordinated formally through specialization, authority, hierarchy,

1986), 44-45.
3 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Armv Air
Arm 1917-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1985),
124-126.
4 Rom Harre and Roger Lamb, The Encyclopedic Dictionary of
Psychology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983), 428.
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division of labor, communication, and standard procedures toward the
accomplishment of certain goals, objectives, or some common, mutually agreed
upon purposes. Organizations constitute a particular kind of social system
which has certain formal characteristics. Formal organizations exhibit:
• Specific goal orientation
•

Division of work into subtasks and assignment as official duties to
established positions in the organization

•

Hierarchical arrangement of positions and clearly established
authority relationships

•

General and impersonal rules which govern, to a large extent, what
people do in their official capacity and which guide interpersonal
interactions among people in the organization

Organizational behavior is more precise than a related term, human relations.
While human relations suggests "the interactions between people in all kinds of
situations in which they seek, through mutual action, to achieve some purpose,"
organizational behavior refers to "a discipline that seeks to describe, understand,
and predict human behavior in the environment of formal organizations."6
An organizational chart is a simplified graphic presentation of the formal
interrelationships of the various structural and functional units of an
organization in terms of their

5 Robert G. Owens, Organizational Behavior in Education. Second
Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981), 25.
6 Ibid., 23.

13
•

channels of formal communication

•

purposes and objectives

•

lines or levels of formal authority, control, and coordination

•

tasks, processes, activities, and their location.7

Administration
Administration refers to the sum of all the ideas, techniques, procedures,
and processes which are employed to help an organization maintain,
coordinate, and control formally and informally organized human and material
resources for achieving its predetermined goals. The administrative code under
which an organization operates is a complete set of administrative rules and
regulations, while administrative control is the continuous job of evaluating,
planning, organizing, regulating, restraining, analyzing, verifying, and
synchronizing the activities of the organization.
Every organization requires management. Administrative decision
making refers to any act of decision-making concerned with the establishment,
maintenance, revision, or abandonment of goals, objectives, policies, and other
related actions of an organization as made by the head, heads, or other
members of top management. An administrative officer is a high-level staff

7 Ivan S. Banki, Dictionary of Administration and Management (Los
Angeles: Systems Research Institute, 1981), 428.
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officer who may be in charge of personnel, training, budgeting, or other related
administrative functions.
The overall administrative structure, usually consisting of line, staff, and
auxiliary agencies or departments through which the management and control
of personnel and operations are accomplished, is called the administrative
organization. In order to administer the organization effectively, administrative
planning is necessary. This is a systematic process of looking and thinking
ahead to recognize and define future trends, to see the relationships between
these trends and organizational objectives, and to take the necessary actions to
adjust to these in terms of the general framework and objectives of the
organization, with the feasible, efficient, and economic use of personnel,
money, methods, and other resources.
Every organization, in order to operate effectively, needs defined
policies and procedures. Administrative policy is a statement of a rule, decision,
or judgement which, by defining and outlining the objectives and goals of an
organization, can guide and regulate organizational policies and methods.
Similarly, administrative procedures are the fundamental procedures and
methods by which an organization or agency can coordinate or regulate its own
actions.8

8 Ibid., 105-108.

Acronyms
Words formed from the initial letters or groups of letters of the words in
a name or phrase are called acronyms. Examples include WAC, Women’s
Army Corps, or LO RAN from long range navigation.9 The military is famous
for using acronyms in describing almost any name.

Literature on Leadership
Management became a science with the publication of Taylor’s Pig Iron
studies in 1911. Like educational theory, management concepts renew and
recycle over time. According to Hersey and Blanchard, between 1911 and
1991, twenty-eight major theories of management, noted as milestones in the
development of motivation and leadership, were put forward.10
Leadership research has focused on men primarily in business situations.
Warren Bennis, for example, identified four common traits shared by all ninety
leaders he studied:
•

Management of attention--The ability to communicate a sense of
outcome, goal, or direction that attracts followers.
Management of meaning~The ability to create and communicate
meaning with clarity and understanding.
Management of trust—The ability to be reliable and consistent so
people can count on them.

9 Webster’s College Dictionary. 4th ed. (New York: Random House,
1991), 13.
10 Hersey and Blanchard, 95.
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•

Management of self-The ability to know one’s self and to use one’s
skills within limits of strengths and weaknesses.11

McCall and Lombardo, in their study of leaders who should have made it to
the top, found the following fatal flaws:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Insensitive to others: abrasive, intimidating, bullying style
Cold, aloof, arrogant
Betrayal of trust
Overly ambitious: thinking of next job, playing politics
Specific performance problems with the business
Overmanaging-unable to delegate or build a team
Unable to staff effectively
Unable to think strategically
Unable to adapt to boss with different style
Overdependent on advocate or mentor.12

Personality traits among leaders may or may not be the most important
attribute of leadership; situation may be.
The following four assumptions are generally used to describe and
understand leadership:
•

Leadership is describable in terms of styles of behavior that leaders
use in relating to groups.

•

A key issue is the extent to which leader behavior should be
directive (authoritarian), on the one hand, or participative
(democratic), on the other hand.

•

There is no one universal, best way to exercise leadership under all
conditions; it is necessary, therefore, to use some system for assessing
the situational contingencies in selecting a style of leader behavior.

11 Ibid., 98.
12 Ibid., 99.
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•

In choosing a leadership style (for example, to be directive or
participative), the appropriate criterion is effectiveness (for example,
which style produces the greatest organizational effectiveness?).13

Hersey and Blanchard proposed the relative concept of situational
leadership. Maturity, they believe, is defined as "the capacity to set high but
attainable goals, the willingness and ability to take responsibility, and the
experience of an individual or group,"14 Further, the maturity of both
individuals and the work group determines the appropriate supervisory or
leader behavior. Situational leadership applies directly to both military and
educational environments because it relates both the leader and the group.
Related to the situational leadership model is the contingency leadership
model. Developed by Fred Fiedler, this model suggests that leaders perform
best in situations which are favorable to them. Favorableness to the leader may
be related to these factors:
• The quality of relations between leader and followers
• The degree to which the task is well structured
• The power of the leader’s position15

13 Owens, 157-158.
14 Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational
Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1965), 161.
15 Owens, 162.
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In other words, the leadership style must be appropriate to the situation.
Therefore, leaders need to be trained with the intent of:
•

increasing the skills required for engaging in the behaviors required
for diagnosing the situational contingencies
increasing the skills required for engaging in the behaviors required
to implement a range of leadership styles

•

understanding one’s own behavior and acquire and experiment with
new behaviors16

The three areas of skills required for effective leadership in given situations are
situation sensitivity, situational management, and style flexibility.17

Methodology
The design of this study was historical, observational, and retrospective.
The researcher, as a member of the Flying Tigers, had the advantage of contact
with key participants and primary document sources involved in the period
under study. In addition, as an educator with nearly 50 years of experience
combined with the review of the literature on administration, leadership, and
organization, he was able to draw comparisons between both his personal and
documented history as one of the Flying Tigers and his current experience as a
classroom educator.

16 Owens, 180.
17 Ibid.
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To the extent possible, quantitative data profiles were collected on the
surviving members of the 22nd Bomb Squadron. Leadership and
administrative skills were noted where appropriate, and background
information was reported as known. Primary documents were examined
through the historical archives of the Air Force Historical Research Agency
(HRC) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and secondary resources were also
reviewed.
Historical research is a complex process; therefore, applicable research
procedures were carefully incorporated in order to establish an effective design.
For example, external and internal criticism procedures were used to insure
proper documentation with both an internal and an external, or third-party,
evaluator. Consequently, both internal and external validity are built into the
evaluation design.18
Another compensatory safeguard employed to guard against the pitfalls
and problems with oral historical reports was triangulation cross-checks.
Triangulation methodology involves the use of several different methods to
study the same object. A form of replication, triangulation cross-checks can be
achieved by collecting the same data from different samples, at different times,

18 Walter R. Borg and Meredith Damien Gall, Educational Research
(White Plains, N.Y.: Longman, 1989), 750-752.

20
and in different places. This activity increases confidence in the validity of the
research regardless of the type of analysis used.19

Observational Research
Observational research is used primarily for investigating human
behavior. In the context of this study, observation was, in the strictest sense,
retrospective because the issues now under investigation were not recorded at
the time. The advantage to this ex post facto approach, however, is that the
presence of the observer, the researcher, had no impact on the behavior of the
participants. Further, observer bias is diminished because of the initial lack of
attention to the topic, but high interest to the activities of the Flying Tigers
during the events themselves.
One subset of observational research, however, is the case study.
Involving the detailed study of a single subject or phenomenon, the case study
can be used ". . . as an example of a class of events or a group of
individuals."20 Relying primarily on interviews and documents, historical case
studies of organizations can provide insight into issues of organizational
development, leadership, and administration. The present study, then, is a
historical case study of the development of the Flying Tigers in relation to
educational administration and leadership in the current school environment.

19 Ibid., 393.
20 Ibid., 488.

CHAPTER 3

THE HISTORY OF THE FLYING TIGERS
During World War II, this researcher, who later became an educator,
was a fighter-bomber pilot as a member of the Flying Tigers. Drawing on
observations and historical investigation, the following research questions were
posed:
1. How did the Flying Tigers come to be?
2. What was the importance of the Flying Tigers to the success of the
United States in World War II?
3. What was the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying
Tigers?
a. Was the mode appropriate for the military?
b. Was the mode appropriate for the time?
4. How does wartime combat compare to the educational environment
today?
5. How does the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying Tigers
apply to today’s educational scene?
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Introduction
How did the Flying Tigers come to be? The history reported here
concerns the 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers, who were part of the
World War II action between 1942 and 1945 in China, Burma, and India,
known as the CBI Theater. (See Appendix B, Maps of the CBI Theater.)
Trained by the educational system of their own country, these Americans used
every fiber of their intellects to thwart the enemy. The Flying Tigers exhibited
natural and learned leadership and administrative skills in their battle for
freedom. This is their story of the part they played, whether significant or
unimportant, in this phase of United States history and how their leadership
relates to the current educational environment.
On the morning of 7 December 1941, at 7:55 A.M., Japanese airplanes
attacked Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu in Hawaii.
Four days later, Germany and Italy joined Japan in a declaration of war against
the United States. Nearly four years later, the United States ended the war by
releasing a single atom bomb over Nagasaki from a B-29 four-engine bomber
on 9 August 1945. Between the first bomb dropped on the United States to
the final bomb dropped by American pilots, many lives were lost, but the
United States and her allies were victorious against the Axis powers.
The 22nd Bomb Squadron, 341st Bomb Group, 69th Composite Wing,
Fourteenth Air Force, the Flying Tigers, China-Burma-India, Asiatic-Pacific
Theater, played a significant role in helping the United States of America
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defeat the Axis powers of Japan and Germany. Yet, in 1939, this group simply
did not exist, for it had been neither visualized nor materialized as it had not
been needed before.

An Overview of the United States Army during World War II
The army developed by the United States to fight World War II
represented a kind of artistry and truly expressed the spirit of its age like great
architecture or poetry or music. This new army was idealistic, inventive, and
optimistic. Had it failed, the world would still be reeling from the crash.
The army created by the United States for World War II went to war
and never lost a campaign. Losses involving Americans were minimal. The
fall of the Philippines, directed by Americans, for example, was actually fought
by Filipinos. In fact, the war-time army lost only one battle, at Sidi-bou-Zid in
Tunisia, of more than one hundred fought around the world. Further,
Americans suffered only one other major check which transpired at the Rapido
River crossing. In conclusion, nothing in the annals of war compares with this
army, and no other army ever compiled a comparable record of victories.1

An Overview of Aviation History Prior to World War II
In order to understand the need for the 22nd Bomb Squadron, it is
helpful to review the first four decades of aviation history. Since Orville and

1 Geoffrey Perret, There’s A War to Be Won: The United States Army in
World War II (New York: Random House, 1991), xxvi-xxviii.
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Wilbur Wright flew their plane at Kitty Hawk in 1903, World War II was only
the second time that the United States had entered a major air war. Although
Americans had invented the airplane, its development and military adaptation
were delegated to other nations.
The army purchased its first airplane in 1909. Congress authorized the
army’s first special appropriation for aviation, in the amount of $125,000, in
1911. By 1914, the United States ranked fourteenth in total funds appropriated
for aviation, well below countries such as Greece and Bulgaria. From 1909 to
April 1917 when the United States entered World War I, the army had
acquired only 224 aircraft, and none was a combat model and few were still in
commission when finally needed. At the time war was declared, the Army had
only two flying fields and 55 trainers. In fact, General Pershing later remarked
of the trainers, "Fifty-one were obsolete and the other four obsolescent."2
Even though the only requisites for air power are raw materials and
enthusiasm, it is obvious that the United States literally had no air force in
1917. For World War I, however, little psychological or material preparation
had occurred because of a lack of lead time. On the other hand, during the
long truce between the two world wars, people understood clearly, certainly by
1939, that peace could not be sustained. Consequently, the period between

2 Ibid., 6-7.

25
1939 and 1941 witnessed hurried re-armament. Even so, when war came, the
United States was not quite prepared.
The history of the Army air arm, the Air Service, during the period from
1917 through 1941 reflects the general pattern set by United States military
policies. Created from no previous experience, the Air Service had just over
two months of combat experience in France in World War I followed by a
peacetime period. As a result, in 1919, the Air Service was rapidly and
thoroughly demobilized. In addition, following World War I, national military
policy opposed a large and expensive establishment in the interest of world
peace and domestic economy. The Air Service, as the junior member of the
military with no control over its own future, died of a lack of funds and
personnel. In 1939, however, as the nation began again to gird for war, the
need for expansion of the Air Corps was conditioned by the efficacy of the Air
Service during World War I as well as by two decades of peace.3
Unfortunately, the story of the Air Service during World War I, upon
which their existence in World War II depended, had been more of promise
than of achievement. Their combat record, although excellent, was brief, and it
was far more modest than the public was led to expect or believe. Official
reports of the activities of the Air Service during wartime were a combination
of statistics and apology and, therefore, failed to achieve their brave promises

3 Wesley F. Craven and James S. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World
War II. Volume One (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 3-5.
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of 1917. As a result, the extravagant assurances of the Air Service received a
great deal of public criticism because of the public perception of the feebleness
of the air effort. In order to keep the Air Service alive, those in charge of
military aviation, who were both civilians and officers, made rash predictions in
order to secure support for unprecedented amounts of appropriations. Their
claims, however, were totally unwarranted and resulted in bitter reactions from
both politicians and the public upon exposure.4 A summary of the
development of aviation is described as a time line in Table 1.
The Problem of Organization and Leadership in the Air Service
The first Army aviation office was set up as the Aeronautical Division of
the Signal Corps on 1 August 1907. The Chief Signal Officer was no aviator;
therefore, with so small an officer corps, the Army Signal Corps turned to
civilian sources for leadership. Of course, at that time, few had knowledge
either of aviation requirements or military procedure. To provide legitimacy to
the Air Service, a law of 1 October 1917 gave to the Aircraft Production Board,
a subsidiary of the Council of National Defense, legal status as the Aircraft
Board. This new entity was headed by a civilian and contained two other
civilians and six officers, three each from the Army and Navy. The purpose of
this panel was to supervise and direct the purchase and production of all

4 Ibid., 5.
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aircraft engines and related materials, as authorized by the Secretary of War
and the Secretary of the Navy.
Table 1
Aviation Time Line
Event

Year
1903

Orville and Wilbur Wright fly the first airplane at Kitty Hawk, NC

1907

First Army aviation office, Aeronautical Division of Signal Corps,
established

1909

Army purchases first airplane

1911

Congress appropriates $125,000 for aviation

April 1917
October 1917

United States enters World War I
Aircraft Board created

1917

Foulois appointed Chief of Air Service

1918

Patrick replaces Foulois

November 1918

World War I Armistice

1919

Air Service demobilized

1926

Army Air Corps created

1935

GHQ Air Force established

1935

XB-17 tested

1937

B-17 power overestimated

1939

Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) created

1939

Greater appropriations mark the beginning of Air Corps expansion

1940

Expansion by 2,400% of American aircraft industry

1941

Air power used as a striking force

1941

AWPD/1, World War II air doctrine, developed

June 20, 1941

Army Air Force established
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In spite of the establishment of the Aircraft Board, the organization and
training of air units continued to be the responsibility of the Chief Signal
Officer, who did not have a controlling voice in the production of material. As
a result, the air program assumed a position of semi-detachment from the rest
of the war effort with a shaky organization and no precedent to serve as a
guide. American leaders, therefore, turned to European Allies for advice, for,
although they had plenty of money, Americans had no precise knowledge of
aviation requirements.
The European consultants did not understand the situation in America,
however, so coordination with the overall military program was faulty. In spite
of this lack of assistance, in July 1918, an extensive training program was
inaugurated using American universities for ground school training and newlybuilt fields for primary flight instruction. Advanced flight training was
scheduled overseas where the combat experience of the Allies could be
exploited. In addition, instruction in mechanics was similarly divided between
American and European schools.5
Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois was appointed by General Pershing to
the position of Chief of Air Service in November 1917. Foulois brought with
him a large staff including recently commissioned civilians. As a result of this
mix of career and civilian officers, internal jealousies flared. Also, air and

5 Ibid., 7-8.
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ground officers hated one another, and no one in the Air Service was willing to
take advice from men who resolutely refused to enter a plane. The interaction
involved ground officers who accused aviators of being temperamental,
undisciplined, and disorderly. In fact, while General Pershing perceived these
new Air Service men to be of quality, he also felt that General Foulois had
them running around in circles.
Because of his disappointment with Foulois, on 29 May 1918, General
Pershing appointed in his place Brig. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, an engineer who
had never been in an airplane. Simultaneously, the whole administrative
structure of the Air Service was revamped. By Armistice Day in November,
only forty-five squadrons had been assigned to the front. Even at that point,
the American Air Force was dwarfed by that of the Germans, the British, and
the French. In spite of its limitations, however, the Air Service had shot down
781 enemy planes.6 Further, while the Armistice brought relief from battle,
the Air Service continued as the War Department’s anomaly. This resulted in
negative attitudes by and towards the Air Service.
The three paramount trends of the period related to the creation of a
real air force in the United States were the effort to establish an independent
air force, the development of a doctrine of strategic bombardment, and the
search for a heavy bomber. From 1919 to 1939, those goals permeated all

6 Ibid., 9-12.
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efforts in the development of the air force which was ultimately required to
wage the war begun in December 1941.
Most important was the fight for the independence of military
aeronautics. Originally a jurisdictional problem within the Army, it became a
major national issue when the aggressor nations began to march in the midthirties. Before that, the problem of national defense seemed to many
Americans simply an academic exercise invented by the militarists. World War
I, the war to end all wars, created widespread skepticism and profound distaste
for militarism and for war in general. In addition, neither isolationism nor
pacifism, neither the Great Depression nor the New Deal was conducive to
heavy expenditures for the Army and Navy.
Similar to the situation in government spending today, in the inevitable
competition for limited funds the requests of each service were guided by its
peculiar philosophy of national security. For example, the Navy wanted a
strong battle fleet, and the Army to increase its size. The Air Service, on the
other hand, favored a small body of highly trained professionals welded into a
compact striking force ready for instant service. This proactive view found
little support in the General Staff, composed exclusively of ground officers who
were only mildly interested in air power. Further alienating itself, the Air
Service requested a separate budget.7

7 Ibid., 18-19.
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Other sources of friction within the Air Service included personal
ambition, rivalry, the tendency toward empire building, and service loyalties
and jealousies. The Air Service had few general officers, and promotions were
controlled inexorably by seniority, and pilots found themselves many files
behind ground officers because their training took longer. In addition, few
pilots had graduated from West Point and they were discriminated against on
that basis as well. The underlying issue, however, was clearly a negative
attitude toward the airplane and air power.
To most airmen the plane was a genus rather than a species. The
airplane was a new and unique instrument of destruction of such revolutionary
potential that it demanded a sweeping reorganization of the national defense
structure. Only by securing a considerable measure of autonomy could the Air
Service formulate its own combat doctrines, develop appropriate equipment,
and direct its forces in battle. Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia of New
York, an aviator in World War I and an ardent supporter of the independent
air force, testified in 1926:
There is one obstacle in the way of new legislation, Mr. Chairman. That
is the General Staff. If this committee does not lock the doors to the
General Staff, you will not get a bill through.. . The General Staff are
either hopelessly stupid or unpardonably guilty in refusing to recognize
the necessity of making a change in aviation.8

8 Ibid., 23.
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The far-reaching and permanent changes demanded legislative sanction; as a
result, much of the struggle was aired publicly.9
The Need for Air Power during World War II
Several new planes were invented after World War I. For example, in
July 1935, the XB-17 underwent its first test flight with an average speed of 232
miles per hour and a range of 2,100 miles. Delivered as the B-17 in 1937, it
was enthusiastically received and was seen as an excellent bombardment
aircraft for coastal defense. The Air Service was limited, however, to flying
seaward only one hundred miles beyond the shore at that time. In addition, a
range of only 2,100 miles would not enable a plane to cross an ocean.
To rectify this problem, the Douglas XB-19, the Army’s largest prewar
bomber with a range of 5,200 miles, was delivered on 27 June 1941.
Unfortunately, the size and weight of the plane were too great for the power
plants. This factor necessitated the creation of the B-29. This rapid
technological development inspired commanding general of the GHQ Air
Force, Frank M. Andrews, to urge in June 1937,
The world struggle for strategic air bases and effective air fleets is well
under way and will become intensified with the fast moving technical
development of the airplane. Air power is as vital a requirement to the
military efficiency of a great nation as land power and sea power, and
there is no hope for victoiy in war for a nation in which it is lacking.10

9 Ibid., 20-23.
10 Greer, 92.
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The International Perspective on Air Power Before World War II
While debate about the existence of an independent air force and the
development of more powerful bombers raged in the United States, it was clear
that Japan, Italy, and Germany had already recognized the airplane to be a
worthy weapon in achieving their goals of expansion, but they varied in the
doctrine, material, and organization which characterized their air arms. Similar
considerations determined the status of air preparations in Great Britain,
France, and other nations opposing the Axis powers. The clues were obvious,
even at that time, that air power would be an important and possibly decisive
factor in the outcome of World War II.
The Japanese had tested air power in their undeclared war against
China, and the Russo-Manchurian border fighting in 1939 gained them valuable
combat experience. In Europe, the Rome-Berlin Axis seized upon the Spanish
Civil War of 1936-1939 as a proving ground for their weapons. In addition, the
Italian conquest of Ethiopia in the mid-thirties involved the use of warplanes in
tactical experiments. These gave the totalitarian powers an initial advantage
over the allies. The veil of censorship effectively concealed the activities and
potential of the Japanese air forces. As a result, American air officials tended
to underestimate those forces.11

11 Ibid., 75-76.
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The United States Responds to World Aggression
by Building Air Defense
As early as 28 January 1938, President Roosevelt declared United States
national defenses inadequate in the face of warlike preparations abroad which
were threatening world peace and security. He then asked for appropriations
to improve American defense capabilities. A year later, on 12 January 1939,
he asked for a larger sum, and the Air Corps accounted for more than half the
total requests. These appropriations marked the beginning of a radical change
in our foreign policy and marked the beginning of Air Corps expansion which
then peaked in 1944.
President Roosevelt had urged that $300 million be appropriated to
purchase aircraft for the Army. On 16 May 1940, with the extension of the war
in western Europe including the fall of France and the Battle of Britain, the
President called for an annual output of 50,000 aircraft and equal air strength
between the Army and the Navy. The American aircraft industry was asked to
expand its normal capacity of 2,000 planes a year to more than 4,000 a month,
an increase of 2,400 percent over the previous year. The proximity of the war
in Western Europe lent a grim incentive to American efforts.12 As a result,
by the time the United States entered World War II, the Air Corps had in
production heavy bombers--B-17s and B-24s, medium bombers-B-25s and B-

12 Ibid., 101-108.
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26s, light bombers--A-20s and A-24s, and pursuits-P-38s, P-39s, P-40s, and P47s.
Preparation by the United States for World War II
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the United States into a
war for survival. Consequently, the nation’s forces were marshalled on land, on
sea, and in the air. Uniquely, for the first time in military history, air power
was employed as a striking force. This factor drastically altered the course and
nature of the struggle and decisively influenced the outcome.
Where did American air power come from? It was the product of men
and machines. It also depended upon practical and usable ideas. The air
force, still in its infancy, had neither traditions nor theories developed over
long centuries of experience. Air warfare entered the war scene with dramatic
suddenness and, in an incredibly short time, presented awesome and
revolutionary weapons of destruction. Consequently, human imagination was
staggered by this new medium which required vision for optimum use for both
offense and defense. Beyond this challenge, stakes were enormously high in
terms of national power and survival.
According to Major George Fielding Eliot, the history of civilization
recounts three revolutionary military inventions or discoveries: discipline,
gunpowder, and the airplane. The airplane has provided warfare not only the
means of striking the enemy’s army or navy, but also the ability to hit directly
the source and seat of power, the citizenry, the capital city, and the political,
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industrial, and commercial centers without having to overthrow the enemy’s
armed forces.13

The Development of Air Doctrine
The development of air doctrine is a stoiy of an unprecedented
intellectual achievement involving bold imagination, stern logic, and new
patterns of thought. Persistence was also evident in the face of fierce
opposition, vested interest, and rigid thinking. By the time the crucial test
came in 1941, America had the makings of air power--both the men and
machines as well as a carefully developed doctrine which could readily be
translated into a plan of military action. While the soundness of that doctrine
has been affirmed by the positive results of America’s air war, it is important to
examine the correct and incorrect steps taken by the air arm during its
formative period between 1917 and 1941 which ultimately led to the creation of
the Flying Tigers.M Table 2 outlines the development of United States air
doctrine before entry into World War II.

13 Greer, vii.
14 Ibid., vii.
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Table 2
Development of United States Air Doctrine 1917 - 194115
Period

Developer

Principles

1917 - 1918

Army Air Arm

Only test of American airmen and
equipment prior to World War II

1919 -1926

Heroic Age of Doctrinal
Development

Army Air Corps established

1926 - 1935

Air Force Idea

Technological advances in airplane design
and production
Establishment of the GHQ Air Force

1935 - 1939

Refinement and
Substantiation of the Longrange Bomber Concept

Created Office of the Chief of the Air
Corps (OCAC)

1939 - 1941

Preparation of Air Doctrine
for World War II

AWPD/1 document approved
Army Air Force established

The Fight for Air Force Autonomy
The agitation for a separate branch did not come from the airmen, but
rather it emanated from Rep. James Hay, Chairman of the House Committee
on Military Affairs, in February 1913. The proposed bill would have created a
separate Air Corps as a line component of the Army. Hearings showed,
however, that most military men, including flyers, were opposed to separation
at that time. For example, acting Chief Signal Officer Col. George P. Scriven
felt that aviators were young men without the requisite scientific knowledge
and mature judgement. Other future leaders of American air power such as
Benjamin D. Foulois, Henry H. Arnold, and William Mitchell thought it was

15 Ibid., v-vi.

38
too early for a separate Air Corps but that separation was only a m atter of
time. Captain Paul Beck, another leader, favored separation and charged that
the longer the Signal Corps controlled aeronautics, the smaller the potential for
autonomy. As a result, the rift between aviators and their non-flying superiors
continued to widen.
American forces in 1917 also had to move from the field of theory to
the field of action. This tended to strengthen the influence of the ground
officers because the war had to be fought with available weapons, and the
battle on the Western Front was already frozen in a complex pattern of ground
operations. It was a struggle of infantry, trenches, and artillery; of attack and
counterattack; of attrition and reinforcement. The high command regarded air
operations as an adjunct to the mighty ground forces which had been
committed to mortal and decisive combat rather than as a strength unto itself.
A proponent of an autonomous air force, General Billy Mitchell was
court-martialed for unbecoming conduct on 17 December 1925 and was
suspended from duty for five years. After he resigned from the army on 27
January 1926, the supporters of air power retreated in disillusionment to more
moderate ground. As a result, the Army Air Corps was created in 1926.
After 1926, the tenor of the arguments changed because of technological
advances in aircraft design and production. Many new developments like the
creation of the high-speed bomber, the two-engine B-9 and B-10, and the
four-engine B-17 Flying Fortress as well as the move of the Air Corps Tactical
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School from Langley to Maxwell Field, Alabama, helped the cause of
autonomy. At Maxwell Field, airmen were able to wrestle vigorously with
problems such as the nature of war, the employment of air power, and the
tactical doctrines of aviation. The General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force
became a reality in 1935.16
Struggles in China, Ethiopia, and Spain during the 1930s were neither
major wars nor real trials of modern air power. They were, instead, limited
proving grounds for weapons and techniques of aviation support. The new
direction was not set until President Roosevelt promoted air power build-up in
1937. On 1 March 1939, Roosevelt gave jurisdiction of the GHQ Air Force to
the Chief of the Air Corps and created the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps
(OCAC).17
By 1939, the development of air doctrine accelerated because of Hitler’s
obvious bid for superiority. As more and more of the countries of the world
became involved in the struggle against Axis domination, the pressure to add to
the demand for powerful military aviation became intense. In July 1941, the
United States air planners in Washington were required to transform their
theories of air doctrine into a practical plan for air action against the nation’s
potential enemies. This document was designated AWPD/1 and was submitted

16 Greer, 44-75.
17 Ibid., 76-106.
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to and approved by the War Department. AWPD/1 served as the actual
blueprint for air operations against the Axis powers.
The War Department and Congress finally understood the need for an
autonomous air force. Consequently, the Army Air Force was established on
20 June 1941 in Army Regulation 95-5. Directed by a chief who also served as
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and coordinated all the activities of military
aviation, the commander was aided by the Chief of the Air Corps, who was still
charged primarily with training and material, and by the Commanding General,
Air Force Combat Command, which was a redesignation for GHQ Air Force.
In addition, an Air Council comprised of the Assistant Secretary of War for
Air, the Chief of Army Air Forces, the Chief of the War Plans Division, the
Chief of the Air Corps, the Commanding General of the Air Force Combat
Command, and other members as appointed by the Secretary was established
to make periodic reviews and to coordinate major aviation projects of the
Army. This was the organizational structure in place for the United States Air
Force on 7 December 1941. (See Appendix C, Organizational Chart and
Tactical Unit History).18 The infrastructure for successful air power was now
in place.

18 Greer, 107-127.
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The Birth of the 22nd Bomb Squadron
Prior to its reorganization as the 22nd Bomb Squadron in 1938, the 22nd
Aero Shooting Star Squadron saw action on the Western Front during World
War I from September 1918 until the Armistice, 11 November 1918. Based at
Belrain, Souilly, and Toulon, France, it fought as a pursuit squadron, and the
unit shot down thirty-five German planes and sustained the loss of seventeen
pilots. An exemplary leader, Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, then a lieutenant, was
among the daredevils who flew the rickety airplanes, started the 22nd on its
historical path, and won a Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) for shooting down
two enemy aircraft.19 Three years before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor,
on 1 November 1938, the 22nd Bomb Squadron (H)20, 7th Bomb Group (H),
was reorganized at Hamilton Field, California.

The 22nd Bomb Squadron at the Beginning of World War II
On 7 December 1941, the 22nd Bomb Squadron was a part of the 7th
Bomb Group and was comprised of B-17s; therefore, it was considered a heavybomb group unit. At the moment of the Japanese attack, some of this group
were flying unarmed to Pearl Harbor from their base on the mainland. They
were forced to circle helplessly while the Japanese fighters and bombers were

19 Fred M. Sibley and Donald E. Tewes, The Bombing Bulldogs. 22nd
Bombardment Squadron (New York: Commanding General, Fourteenth Air
Force, 1945), 11.
20 H denotes heavy bombers.
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unleashing their missiles on United States territory. Historically, this incident
gave rise to the 22nd Bomb Squadron, which later became part of the Flying
Tigers, in World War II.21

The Rebirth of the 22nd Bomb Squadron, Bombing Eagles, in 1942
According to official records, the 22nd Bomb Squadron was activated, or
reborn, pursuant to General Order (GO) #84, Headquarters, 3rd Air Force,
Tampa, Florida, dated 26 April 1942, retroactive to 4 April 1942. Attached to
the 17th Bombardment Group (M)22 for training and personnel, the 22nd
Bomb Squadron was assigned through Special Order (SO) #71, Columbia
Army Air Base, SO #5, 67th Observation Group, Sub Base, Esler Field,
Louisiana, SO #116, Key Field, Mississippi, and by further orders attached to
the 17th Bomb Group and other organizations for rations.23 The insignia
under which the Bombing Eagles flew is located in Appendix D.
The development of the 22nd Bomb Squadron can be traced from its
military infancy in Columbia, South Carolina, through the year 1942. In that
year, it became a full-fledged bombing unit in the China-Burma-lndia (CBI)

21 Historical Research Agency (Hq USAF HRC), 22nd Bomb Squadron.
1941-1945. Documents - Copies on File, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 7-20 July
1994), 1941 Files.
22 M denotes medium bombers.
23 Historical Research Agency (Hq USAF HRC), 22nd Bomb Squadron.
1941-1945. Documents - Copies on File, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 7-20 July
1994), 1942 Files.
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Theater, part of the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Combat, under the command of
the United States Army Air Force. The new recruits came from Georgia, New
Jersey, Washington, and Kansas; from Fort Worth, Chicago, New York City,
and Portland; from large cities, small towns, and farms. They had been
machinists, farmers, jewelers, singers, teachers, doctors, and factory workers.
Some had made their careers with the army, while others had just entered.
The national emergency known as World War II had transformed them into
pilots, bombardiers, mechanics, ambulance drivers, bomb sight experts, and
supply clerks. From widely separated camps, they were expedited to Columbia,
South Carolina, the birthplace and nucleus of the squadron.24
Deployment began shortly after Pearl Harbor. The 22nd Bomb
Squadron (H) Engineering Section moved to Amberly Field, thirty-five miles
from Brisbane, Australia, on 24 December 1941. That group remained there to
assemble P-40 fighters and A-24 dive bombers. The 22nd and 11th Bomb
Squadrons (H) embarked on board the U.S.S. President Polk on 17 January
1942 and arrived at Java about 28 January 1942. Further, the Air Echelon
began to reach Java about 3 Januaiy 1942 under the command of Major
Hobson. On the night of 25 February 1942, the 22nd and 11th Bomb
Squadrons (H) evacuated Java and returned to Australia in order to become
part of the 19th Bomb Group (H). Before they could reach Australia,

24 Ibid., 1942 Files.
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however, they were redirected to India and arrived in Karachi on 13 March
1942. In the meantime, the remainder of the 7th Bomb Group (H), consisting
of the Headquarters Squadron, 9th Bomb Squadron, and 88th Reconnaissance
Squadron, attached, sailed from Brisbane, Australia, on 4 February 1942 to join
the Air Echelon in Java.23
On 26 April 1942 at Columbia, South Carolina, the Ground Echelon of
the 22nd Bomb Squadron (M) was activated and embarked from Charleston on
28 May 1942 bound for India to operate with the 7th Bomb Group. The Air
Echelon of the original 22nd Bomb Squadron (M), formed from Project #157
at Columbia was commanded by Lt. Blair M. Sorensen and was composed of
officers and enlisted men from the 17th Bomb Group and the 89th
Reconnaissance Squadron of the Columbia Army Air Base. The Air Echelon
embarked for Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, Florida, after two weeks of
training in Columbia and were joined by members of the 11th Bomb
Squadron’s Air Echelon which was part of the same squadron. The first flight
departed the continental limits of the United States on 1 May 1942, destination
Karachi, India, via Pan American Airways’ South Atlantic Ferry Route.
Not everyone made it to India. One leader, Lt. Daniel E. Kelly, landed
in Vichy French territory, and he and his crew were interned for the duration
of World War II. Lt. Eero A. Wiitala, another leader, ran out of fuel and

25 Ibid., 1942 Files.

45
landed on a beach on the coast of Liberia damaging his landing gear. The
airplane was later salvaged for parts. Lt. Keith H. Thomas and crew on yet
another plane were presumed lost in a thunderstorm approximately thirty
minutes after taking off at Accra. They were never found. With only minor
repairs, the remainder of the squadron arrived at Karachi, India, on 16 May
1942, with Lt. Joseph L. Skeldon, Lt. Robert V. Ford, and Lt. Blair M.
Sorensen and their crews arriving first.
War duties began immediately. Lieutenant Sorensen was directed to fly
a secret mission to China for the purpose of surveying the possibility of
operating aircraft in combat there. The 11th Bomb Squadron was reorganized
and combined with crews from the 22nd Bomb Squadron to bring it to full
strength. The 11th Bomb Squadron then flew to China where they stayed until
the end of the war. The remaining crews of the 22nd Bomb Squadron were
attached to the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the 7th Bomb
Group (H) and were assigned special duties throughout India such as
reconnaissance, coastal patrol work, and bombing missions to Burma.26
On 15 September 1942, the 22nd Bomb Squadron was made a part of
the 341st Bomb Group, Tenth Air Force, by General Order #5, Karachi Air
Defense Area, Karachi, India. That meant that the 22nd Bomb Squadron had
become a full-fledged member of the CBI theater of operations within the

26 Ibid., 1942 Files.
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Asiatic-Pacific Theater. In addition, the 491st Bomb Squadron was activated
and assigned to the 341st Bomb Group. To lead the 491st Bomb Squadron, 1st
Lt. James D. Pigg, 1st Lt. Edward Garrett, and 2nd Lt. Frank I. Redman were
assigned.
The Problem of Leadership in the CBI Theater
Six Army air forces figured in the CBI equation:
•

Fifth (Southwest Pacific)
Seventh (Central Pacific)

•

Tenth (India-Burma)

•

Eleventh (North Pacific)

•

Thirteenth (South Pacific)

•

Fourteenth (China)

Widely scattered throughout the Pacific and the CBI, these separate air forces
performed in isolation. As a result, they became characterized by the quality
of their leaders so that each was unique. Further, the war against Japan lacked
unity of command which exaggerated the eccentricities of the groups. While
United States forces in World War II reflected a somewhat disjointed nature
from theater to theater, the goal, in theory at least, was to undergird all
operations with an over-all strategy formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
(CCS) and with a common dependence upon a single pool for material
resources.
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Two particular problems inhibited the success of the Allies. The
logistical problem in CBI was more formidable than in any other theater
because of the distance from either the United States or the United Kingdom.
Compounding the problem, transport facilities were unequal to wartime needs.
Even China was totally dependent for supplies upon airlifts operating under
grave natural and military hazards.27
The second problem was the lack of a common objective besides the
defeat of Japan among the Allied powers. Because the political aims of the
Chinese, the British, and the Americans diverged substantially, any agreement
on strategy was forestalled, and a command system of bewildering complexity
was fostered. Even among United States generals there was a lamentable lack
of accord.
The United States was quite clear on its goal in the CBI Theater. The
chief aim was to help keep China in the war by providing lend-lease materials
and technical assistance. This objective involved little in the way of ground
force commitments, so service and air forces constituted the main contribution.
The Tenth Air Force’s mission was to protect the Hump air route over the
Himalayan mountain range between India and China by which China was
nourished and to aid in clearing a trace for the Ledo Road which was to
supplement the airlift with a ground line of communication (LOC) from Burma

27 Perret, vii.
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to Running. The Fourteenth Air Force in China helped guard the Hump
Route, aided Chinese ground operations, and attacked Japanese air forces and
shipping.28 (Refer to Appendix E for appreciation from the Chinese.)

The Tenth Air Force
Air transport played a unique role in China where the Hump airlift was
the sole means of supply and where air activities were limited less by the size
of United States forces than by the tonnage available for fuel, bombs, and
ammunition. In the CBI Theater, primitive rail and highway systems imposed a
heavy brake on the movement of material. Supply and maintenance suffered
also from a dearth of proper facilities handicapped by low priorities and
difficult lines of communication. On the bright side, improvements occurred
eventually so that some rear-area bases were comparatively well-equipped. At
advance bases, however, facilities remained primitive, temporary, and
makeshift. As a result, aviation engineers developed great skill in the rapid
development of airstrips and other installations, and stories of ingenious
improvisations in maintenance and modification have become almost legendary.
At times, however, the plentiful use of bailing wire and tin cans could not keep
the planes operable in spite of Yankee ingenuity.
Primitive conditions in the forward bases affected men as well as
machines. In the tropical jungles of India and the crude situation of China,

28 Ibid., viii.
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climate, disease, and fatigue took their toll. Air crews and ground crews lived
constantly in tents and on field rations. War is not intended to be pleasant and
the circumstances that shape morale are complex; however, the Pacific and
Asiatic theaters generally suffered in comparison with the European Theaters
of Operations (ETO) and the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO)
insofar as the Army Air Force (AAF) was concerned.29

Conflict Within the Tenth Air Force
Even before the United States entered World War II, President
Roosevelt appointed Gen. Claire Chennault (Appendix F), a retired career
military man, to assist China in its defense against Japan. Chennault, an
instructor at Maxwell Air Force Base, was a leader and free-thinker, not a yes
man who followed instructions without questioning. He was able to develop a
positive relationship on behalf of the United States with both Chiang-Kai-Shek
and Mao Tse-Tung, Chinese leaders, so that the president could initiate a lendlease program for supplies and equipment with them. Chennault, who had
written a book on pursuit flying, also became the leader of the American
Volunteer Group (AVG), a band of mercenaries consisting of pilots and
mechanics who received a $500 bonus from the Chinese for every Japanese
plane they shot down.

29 Ibid., ix-xiii.
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A significant part of General Chennault’s plan was his demand of a free
hand in the employment of air forces in China; he disliked subordination to the
Tenth Air Force. Friction had developed with Gen. Bissell, who came to the
CBI theater as Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell’s air adviser and later became
commanding general of the Tenth Air Force. In fact, Bissell was purposely
given one day’s seniority over Chennault in his promotion to brigadier general.
On the other hand, Chennault enjoyed the special confidence of Chiang
Kai-shek and the applause of the Chinese people. The Generalissimo had
been disappointed by the failure of the Americans to place a larger air force in
China, and he was suspicious of British influence over the India-based Tenth
Air Force. He seemed also to have anticipated making use of the proposed
change in command arrangements to resurrect the moribund Chinese Air Force
which included trained pilots but had no aircraft. These issues, rooted in
differing concepts of strategy, came into focus at the beginning of 1943 with the
question of an independent air force for Chennault.30
The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) met at Casablanca in January 1943
to discuss the intrinsically complex problem of the CBI Theater. General
Stilwell persisted in the belief that it would be necessary to reopen a land route
to China using Chinese armies which he had trained and would lead. After all,
he had already trained 45,000 Chinese troops at Ramgarh, India, in the

30 Craven and Cate, 436-437.
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summer and fall of 1942 as the X Force. He had twenty-seven divisions of
Chinese in Yunan Province, the Y Force, to collaborate with his X Force. He
would then use the X and Y forces as a pincer movement forcing the Japanese
out of Northern Burma. His plan was to build a new road behind the X Force
as it advanced southeastward from Ledo in India until land communications
could be reestablished with China by the juncture of the two forces.
Chennault bitterly opposed this strategy because he felt that Stilwell had
overlooked a unique opportunity to use air weapons. In addition, he strongly
believed that Stilwell’s strategy would only prolong the war and that the
manpower should be used to construct additional airfields in Assam, India, and
China for the building of an effective air force in China. Chennault proposed
instead to destroy Japanese air power in China by employing 500 aircraft
deployed from Chinese bases. This modest use of air power would be more
strategically located and would be better able to infiltrate the most vulnerable
points held by the Japanese.31
The 22nd Bomb Squadron’s mission for 1943 was to support the
campaign in Burma to rid the Japanese of their positions. Flying out of
Chakulia, India, their responsibility was to harass and destroy the enemy by sea
and by land. Although hampered by monsoons and inadequate supplies, they
were successful.

31 Ibid, 435-436.
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The Japanese ground forces, supported by their Navy, had moved swiftly
north in Burma and were opposed by the British Burma 1st Division, the
Indian 17th Division, and the Chinese 5th and 6th Army under the command of
General Stilwell. The Japanese outnumbered the Allied defenders in Burma,
drove toward Toungoo, and attacked Magwe Airfield, destroying nine Blenheim
bombers and three AVG P-40s and shooting down three defending Hurricane
fighters. On 2 April 1942, Prome, on the Irrawaddy River, fell.
Shortly after, the Japanese carrier force of she moved into the Indian
Ocean. Airplanes of their strike force sank the British cruisers Dorsetshire and
Cornwall, heavily bombed Colombo and Trincomalee on Ceylon Island, raided
shipping on the Indian Ocean and in the Bay of Bengal, sank fifteen ships, and
sank the British aircraft carrier Hermes. The Japanese ships landed
reinforcements at Rangoon on 6 April 1942. Magwe and Meiktila were
evacuated before the fast-moving enemy and the fall of Lashio, the terminus of
the Burma Road into China, completed the total blockade of China by the
Japanese.
At this point, the Japanese controlled central Burma, so the Allied
forces were ordered back to positions along the Indian border. Mandalay was
evacuated on 30 April; Akyab, on 4 May; Myitkyina, on 8 May 1942. Allied
forces subsequently established themselves north and south of Kalewa along
the Naga Hills and the Chin Hills. Imphal, India, then became the hub behind
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the new lines. The fighting dwindled as the Monsoon season arrived and the
Japanese immediately began consolidating their vast gains in Burma.32
Col. Robert L. Scott, one of Colonel Haynes’ ABC Ferry pilots, longed
to fly a fighter rather than a transport. In April 1942, he convinced Claire L.
Chennault, leader of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), that he could do
something about the Japanese planes roaming free over northern Burma and
endangering the flights of the ABC Ferry. Chennault gave Scott permission to
take over the next P-40 arriving in India on its way to China. Colonel Scott
took the P40-E to Dinjan, had a shark mouth painted on the nose, and flew it
on 30 April 1942.
On 5 May, Colonel Scott flew alone, hunting the enemy from Myitkyina
to Lashio, and he spotted a twin-engine Sally bomber being refuelled in a
comer of Lashio Airfield. He flew three passes, shot up the bomber which
caught fire, and watched it burn. This was the first Japanese plane destroyed
by a Tenth Air Force fighter. On the same mission, Scott also effectively
strafed a column of Japanese troops and set four trucks on fire. In sixty-three
days through the 1st of July, he and his lone P-40 E flew 371 hours, sometimes
flying as many as four missions a day. He was a one-man fighter force over
Burma, striking at troops, gun positions, vehicles, and barges. He even flew a
few missions from China with the Flying Tigers. At the beginning of July 1942,

32 Kenn C. Rust Tenth Air Force Story. (Temple City, CA: Historical
Aviation Album, 1980), 7-9.
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Scott was ordered to leave the ferry service and take command of the newly
activated 23rd Fighter Group.33
From June-October 1942, ground fighting was minimal in Burma near
the Indian border during the monsoon season, and both sides secured their
positions. Brig. Gen. Earl S. Naiden became the third commander of the
Tenth Air Force on 26 June 1942. On 4 July 1942, the AVG’s were disbanded
in China and its planes and some of its pilots were inducted into the 23rd
Fighter Group and activated the same day in Kunming. The 23rd was a
mixture of the AVG, new pilots, and a Ground Echelon that had traveled from
the United States to India along with the Headquarters section of the Tenth
Air Force. The 23rd Fighter Group, plus the 16th Fighter Squadron and the
11th Bomb Squadron (B-25 Mitchells), was placed under command of the
China Air Task Force (CATF), a Tenth Air Force sub-command activated
4 July 1942 with Chennault as its commander. In March 1943, the CTAF
became the Fourteenth Air Force with Chennault as commanding general.
The Tenth Air Force in India had two weak groups with few aircraft-the
partially equipped 51st Fighter Group and the slightly better furnished 7th
Bomb Group, now a composite bomb group with heavy and medium squadrons.
Of its two medium squadrons, the 11th was in China flying with CATF and the
22nd was non-operational, lacking aircraft, spare parts, and personnel. Created

33 Ibid., 9.
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from almost nothing out of the ashes of the Java campaign, the 22nd was no
better off than when it had started.34

The 22nd Bomb Squadron during 1943
During 1943, the squadron members loyally flew and fought as they had
been trained to do. They were unaware of any of the administrative and
leadership controversies taking place in upper echelons within the CBI Theater
which vitally affected their life-and-death struggles for survival.

The Fourteenth Air Force, Bombing Bulldogs,
during 1944 in Yangkai, China
The 22nd Bomb Squadron (M), United States Army Air Force, was
transferred from the Tenth Air Force to the Fourteenth Air Force in January
1944. The advance echelon of the squadron departed from Chakulia, India, on
7 January 1944 and arrived in Yangkai, China, the next day. By the end of the
month, nearly all squadron personnel had been transported to the new station.
Some of the personnel and equipment were transported over the Hump by Air
Transport Command (ATC) in C-46s, C-47s, and C-54s, and some by squadron
B-25 Mitchells. The 22nd Bomb Squadron’s strength for that month included
74 officers and 268 enlisted men. Six were missing in action as of 23 January,
but they had not yet been dropped from the records; an additional 39 were

34 Ibid.
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transferred.35 The insignia of the Bombing Bulldogs is located in Appendix
G.
Many more men arrived in Yangkai during February 1944. The B-25
Mitchells which were waiting for engine changes at Chakulia and Chabua flew
over the Hump as soon as they were able. The challenge for these planes was
to fly at 18,000 feet using the super-charger. This required that all crew
members wear oxygen masks when the temperature plummeted to below
freezing. Even with using the super-charger, however, the fully-loaded aircraft
struggled to maintain altitude and stability. Consequently, the trip over the
Hump was a frightening experience even for the most hardened combat men.
One group, in particular, who traveled in an unarmed transport sighted four
Japanese Zero fighter aircraft which, fortunately, did not attack.
The types of missions were different from the Burma milk runs; flying in
this theater became exciting with the low-level, mast-high missions. In the few
weeks of operations, both the 22nd and the 491st Bomb Squadrons had
inflicted such damage that this section of the Hanoi-Saigon railroad was closed
to traffic for several months. The difficulties of February with bad weather,
unfamiliar terrain, new bombing techniques, and plane and personnel losses all
added up to a different stoiy: each crew returning from a successful mission
reported something new. High altitude and mass bombing of a pin-point target

35 Historical Research Agency (Hq USAF HRC), 341st Bomb Group
1941 - 1945 Documents. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL), 1944 Files.
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were no longer routine. Instead, at most high levels the pilot could see the
direct results of the attack. These missions required every crew member to
engage his resourcefulness because they were all directly involved in the action.
Even though the danger of each mission increased, the flying was never dull.36
The squadron divided geographically around the first of May. Eleven
combat and ground crews were at Yunnanyi while the rest of the outfit
remained at Yangkai. This venture was poorly planned because the length of
the runway and the height of the surrounding hills made it inadvisable to use
the field for tactical operations. On 6 May, Major Weatherly led the formation
of planes with skeleton crews back to Yangkai, and the rest of the attachment
followed by Air Transport Command (ATC) and motor convoy.
The squadron was fortunate to have no member missing or killed in
action during July, but a tragedy occurred that gravely affected all personnel.
Chaplain Thomas Clare was lost on a mission over the Hump. Returning to
the United States to join his family, Chaplain Clare was flying in a B-24 fourengine bomber converted to a cargo/transport airplane. Sadly, it never
reached its destination at Chabua, most likely having crashed in the mountains.
This was not a solitary misfortune either. It was this tragedy, however, that
capped the first two years since the 22nd Bomb Squadron had been born at
Columbia, South Carolina. Despite a series of distressing growing pains, the

36 Ibid., 1944 Files.
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22nd Bomb Squadron developed into an effective arm of the Tenth Air Force
and later the Fourteenth Air Force.
In July 1944, Major Loren S. Nickels replaced Major Edison C.
Weatherly, squadron commander since October 1943. Major Nickels, an old
China veteran with a good understanding of the problems of the CBI Theater,
had been Operations Officer with the 341st Bomb Group and the 11th Bomb
Squadron. With renewed high morale, the squadron flew 99 sorties with 76
tons of bombs dropped, a record since their arrival in China despite the
intermittent bad weather. Similary, September 1944 surpassed July as the
month with the greatest number of flights in spite of consistently bad weather
conditions. Although grounded several days at a time, when the sun shone and
the weather officer gave the go-ahead, they flew a lot. That month there were
113 sorties with 94 tons of bombs dropped on the enemy.
In October, command changed again. Major Philip Main assumed
command of the 22nd Bomb Squadron, relieving Major Loren Nickels who
returned to the interior zone. The total squadron strength that month was 313,
and eight missions were flown by forty-two Mitchells. October 1944 wound up
to be a dismal month of a tragic year, and with the recall of General Stilwell
under extremely veiled and cloudy circumstances, the spirits of many an
American in China reached a new low.37

37 Ibid., 1944 Files.
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The End of World War II
Results of the efforts of the 22nd Bomb Squadron were difficult to
evaluate because their targets were part of a long-range offense strategy.
Missions covered a variety of targets including military installations, storage
areas, and highway bridges. Towards the end of the operation, the squadron
contributed direct support to the Chinese ground offensive and were awarded
special commendation from the field commander as a result. For example,
within two weeks of the squadron’s last sortie, the Burma-Ledo Road was
declared officially open and the first convoy reached China. In total, the
squadron had flown 385 sorties and dropped 286 tons of frags, incendiaries, and
demolition bombs with only one serious injury. When the fighting was over at
the end of 1944, the detachment broke camp and returned to the base by plane
and truck convoy.
Rotations out of the CBI Theater increased by the end of 1944. Even
after discharge, however, safety was not assured. For example, in February
1945, all but one of the squadron members who had left early that month to
return to the United States were reported missing somewhere between Chabua
and Karachi, India. Details of the crash were reported in a letter by T/Sgt.
Marvin Jacobs, the sole survivor. The transport had somehow wandered off
course and crashed in the mountains of Tibet. Jacobs, fortunately, escaped
with only a broken ankle and a severe shaking up. The locals who found him
and took him to their village where he stayed for two weeks before two other
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men were able to parachute to him. For an additional ten days, Jacobs and his
rescuers constructed a landing strip for an L-5, a light single engine aircraft
with short field landing and take-off capabilities used in World War II for air
ambulance service, which eventually brought Jacobs back to a hospital in India.
This was the second similar tragedy and a bitter irony in squadron history in
which successful combatants never made it home.
In February 1945, the 22nd Bomb Squadron was commanded by Lt. Col.
Philip Main and based at Yangkai. In March, however, seven more 22nd
Bomb Squadron men were heroically killed in action flying combat missions
against the Japanese enemy. Only six missions were flown in April. While
American troops were perceived to possess high morale and lots of supplies,
the battle waged in the CBI Theater by the 22nd Bomb Squadron was
somewhat different. Either bad weather, no gasoline, no bombs, or no
ammunition meant no combat missions. In the meantime, the combat crews
were prepared to fly and fight; when unable to, their morale began to slump.

The Death of President Roosevelt
On April 13, 1945, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died. Aside
from the shock of the event itself, war-related concerns dominated
conversations everywhere in the CBI Theater. How would the president’s
demise affect the current war, the future hope for peace, and conditions at
home? The flag flown at half-mast served as a daily reminder of the nation’s
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loss. In office since 1932, Roosevelt had been in office so long that most of the
squadron could not remember another President. The belated air-mail editions
of Time and Newsweek in this time of grief were additional reminders of their
isolation and their slim contact with the United States and the war throughout
the rest of the world.38

The War Winds Down
Although the war in the CBI Theater had not yet ended, victory in
Europe, V-E Day, following Germany’s unconditional surrender was great
news. The celebration was cut short, however, because the 22nd Bomb
Squadron flew another mission the next day. The day after that, the squadron
was jolted once again into the reality of war with fifteen airplanes on a
coordinated medium altitude attack on Pao Ching, China. One of these planes
was hit directly in the pilot’s cock-pit, crashed, and exploded on the west side
of the Tzu Kiang River directly across from Pao Ching. The battle in China
was definitely not over yet.
The squadron was to celebrate its third anniversary overseas in May, but
orders from higher headquarters postponed the celebration because of an
important mission the next day. Even though only five missions flew that

38 Historical Research Agency (Hq USAF HRC), 341st Bomb Group
1941 - 1945 Documents. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL), 1945 Files.
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month, costly losses included two aircraft and thirteen combat crew
members.39 By 27 June, the squadron was able to observe its third
anniversary overseas in spite of inclement weather.
Administratively, the Bombing Bulldogs were, for the most part,
functioning well. The squadron Supply and Maintenance departments were
operating smoothly except for shortages in supply items and parts needed for
maintenance all over China. Of the B-25s, 92 percent were in commission
throughout the month of June. In addition, communications on base and in the
air were excellent; however, the telephone and teletype lines to Kunming were
often down. At the same time, much to everyone’s surprise, the old reliable B25 Mitchell was to be replaced by its more modem counterpart, the A-26
Invader. As a result, a large number of the combat personnel were expected to
be sent to Fenni, India, for four weeks of transition training, and the squadron
looked forward to a superior combat plane which might hasten the end of the
war.
The 22nd Bomb Squadron Changes
The real surprise in July 1945 was that the Fourteenth Air Force
Commander, Maj Gen. Claire Chennault, had resigned and returned to the
United States. That month also marked the beginning of the 22nd Bomb
Squadron as a B-25 (M) squadron. (See Appendix H for diagrams of B-25s

39 Ibid., 1945 Files.

and A-26s.) Almost immediately, it became an A-26 Light/Attack (L)40
fighter-bomber squadron scheduled to move from Yangkai to bases somewhere
on the coast of China, probably Foochow which could be used as a staging
area. The goal was for the A-26s to make direct attack flights to mainland
Japan. Although the Japanese Emperor clearly believed that the Japanese
military was invincible, reality demonstrated poundings by B-29s on Tokyo,
Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe. In fact, Nagoya was hit again with a ten-day fire
blitz that destroyed over thirty-one square miles. As a result, the Japanese
were relying on the wholesale use of kamikaze or suicide attacks against
assaulting fleets because the only remaining pilots were inadequately trained
replacements who were no match for the United States crews. The United
States air offensive on Japan destroyed sixty-six cities, counting the two hit by
atom bombs, and burned out 178 square miles before the Emperor decided to
surrender41

40 L refers to light planes.
41 Craven and Cate, xviii-xx.
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The War in Asia Ends
The sudden and tragic end to the war on September 2, 1945, V-J Day,
was astounding since startling scientific developments rather than direct combat
precipitated it. As a result of the successful assault on Japan with the atom
bomb, those with the technology--the United States, Great Britain, and
Canada-commanded the world. At the 22nd Bomb Squadron still stationed in
China lengthy discussions argued and speculated on the potential effects of
atomic warpower on the future of the world.42

42 Ibid., 1945 Files.

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FLYING TIGERS TO THE SUCCESS
OF TH E UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II

The 341st Bomb Group, 69th Composite Wing,
Fourteenth Air Force, the Flying Tigers
The 341st Bomb Group, activated in India on 15 September 1942,
battled against heavy odds in the CBI Theater. The Japanese, for example,
had cut off the Burma Road by conquering the greater part of Burma and were
threatening to move into India. The job of supplying American units in China
had to be accomplished by transport planes flying from India over the 18,000
foot Himalayas; therefore, few pilots and planes were available to the Chinese
and Indians.
From September through the end of 1942, the 341st Bomb Group was
not yet in suitable condition to commence operations from bases in India
against the Japanese in Burma. Comprised of the 11th and 22nd Bomb
Squadrons which had been assigned to the 7th Bombardment Group (H) and
the 490th and 491st Bomb Squadrons, which were new, the only combat ready
unit was the 11th Bomb Squadron operating under the China Air Task Force
(CATF) in Kunming, China. The other three squadrons as well as the 341st
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Group Headquarters were at Karachi, India. Three months later, with
additional equipment and personnel, all but the 11th Bomb Squadron, which
was stationed in China, moved from Karachi on the west coast of India across
the continent to Chakulia and Ondal near Calcutta. The B-25s prepared to
strike against targets in central Burma from there.1
The B-25s of the 341st Bomb'Group, using the bases at Chakulia and
Ondal as lay-back bases and Argatala as the forward staging field, struck at
bridges, locomotives, railroad yards, trackage, and rolling stock in the MoneyaMandalay-Gokteik region in central Burma; and they ranged as far north as
Myitkyina and as far south as Thazi. The main objective of these bombing
attacks was to delay the movement of supplies from southern Burma to the
Japanese troops fighting in northern Burma.
The bombing of the Myitnge. Bridge illustrated the difficulties
encountered by the 341st Bomb Group. The bridge, ten miles south of
Mandalay, was situated just above the junction of the only two rail lines
running from southern Burma. A most vital link in the 2,060 miles of rail lines
in Burma, the Myitnge Bridge was a four-span, single-track, steel structure 610
feet long. On 1 January 1943, six B-25s loaded with 500 pound bombs struck at
the bridge and scored four hits on the north and south approaches and three
on the southern span. Nine days later the Mitchells repeated their effort, but
___________________________

1 Historical Research Agency. (Hq USAF HRC) 341st Bomb Group 19421945 Documents-Copies on File. Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 7-20 July 1994.
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they were not successful; B-24s of another group, on the other hand, caused
extensive damage. The job of the 341st was to discourage the Japanese as they
attempted to repair the bridge. On 16 January 1943, five B-25s bombed the
bridge with 500 pounders destroying the southern approach which temporarily
suspended renovations. This scenario repeated itself many times during the
year.2
This cyclical bridge-busting process discouraged the B-25 pilots and
crews. In addition, an enormous tonnage of bombs was expended with
comparatively small results. Several causes contributed to this bombing
ineffectiveness. First, the bridges were constructed so that only a direct hit
with a properly-fused, general-purpose bomb inflicted serious damage. Any
delay in detonation would allow the bomb to pass through the super-structure
of the bridge and fall harmlessly into the water beneath. Second, the B-25s
often bombed at high altitudes. A reliable delayed-action fuse was necessary
for low-altitude bombing as well as adequate fighter protection.3

Squadron Relocation
Towards the end of 1943, the 22nd and 491st Bomb Squadrons and the
341st GHQ joined the 11th Squadron at Yangkai, China. Only the 490th
Squadron was left behind to carry on the fight against the Japanese in Burma.

2 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
3 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
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Because of the difficulty in blowing up bridges, the Allied ground forces had
made little progress in driving the Japanese out of Burma even as late as the
summer of 1944.
On 1 January 1944, Maj. Robert A. Erdin accidentally discovered the
trick for destroying bridges while piloting a B-25 at tree-top level the Mu
River Bridge. A large tree loomed up dead ahead, and he quickly flew his
plane upwards to avoid the tree. By the time he brought the plane to the
previous attack level, he was over the target. Cursing his bad luck and
believing the tree had ruined the approach, he ordered the bombs to be
dumped. The crew looked back expecting to see how much the bombs missed
the target. Much to their amazement, two spans of the bridge toppled into the
river. This chance discovery combined with added refinements became known
as Glip bombing, a combination of glide and skip, and fostered success in
wrecking bridges which, in turn, destroyed enemy supply lines.4 (See Appendix
I, Distinguished Unit Citation)
As a result of Erdin’s discovery, the Allied offensive against Japan began
during the summer of 1944. The American, British, Indian, and Chinese forces
advanced down the Hukawng Valley of northern Burma besieged Myitkyina.
The B-25s of the 490th Squadron provided low-level air support by strafing and
bombing troop concentrations as well as by striking at the bridges leading into

4 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
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Myitkyina. The Japanese were in retreat when Myitkyina fell in August 1944.
The 490th then also bombed Indaw, Katha, Bhamo, and Lashio. By April
1945, Mandalay had been taken, and Rangoon was captured shortly thereafter.
After successful completion in Burma, the 490th Bomb Squadron joined the
341st Group in Yangkai, China.

Administrative and Leadership Mode of the Flying Tigers

Management of the 11th Bomb Squadron
The 11th Bomb Squadron, flying out of Kunming, China, since
September 1942, in many ways established the pattern of operational activity
which was followed by the 341st Group after their arrival in China in January
1944. For example, the 11th Bomb Squadron had remained on the ground
from 15-25 September 1942 because of bad weather and lack of maintenance
of the planes. On 25 September, four B-25s, escorted by ten P-40s, set out to
drop their bombs on the Gialam airdrome in Hanoi, west of Haiphong. The
formation was attacked immediately by Japanese twin-engine fighters. To
avoid them, the P-40s had maneuvered into the sun and dived upon the enemy
fighters destroying nine planes.
The 11th Bomb Squadron had emphasized certain types of targets and
strategies which were then adopted by the 341st Group. These targets included
coastal shipping, raids on ports or harbor installations, and visual sea sweeps up
and down coastal waters. One strategy consisted of working in pairs and flying
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parallel courses within sight of each other. Upon sight of an enemy vessel, one
B-25 swept down with machine guns to knock out the anti-aircraft, then the
other B-25 did the bombing. They would then exchange roles on the next
attack. Another strategy was for the B-25s to conduct sea searches at 400 to
500 feet and make bomb runs from there. In this way, they were able to
operate from bases at Kweilin, Suichwan, Kanchow, and Nanking where they
covered the Gulf of Tonkin, the Formosa Straits, and a one-hundred-mile
extension into the South China Sea.
The coastal attacks were particularly important as the shipping routes
from Japan went either from Shanghai south and east down the China coast or
from Japan to Formosa and then east along the coast of China. The China
coastal route was more practical, so the Japanese chose this most of the time.
By interfering successfully with the flow of Japanese shipping, the B-25s were
able to deprive Japan of oil from the East Indies, rubber and tin from Malaya,
bauxite from Indo-China, tungsten from China, and iron ore from Hainan
Island. Therefore, the number one priority of the 341st Bomb Group was to
augment the attacks on shipping routes throughout 1943 and 1944.
Supplementing raids on shipping were the interdiction operations
performed on the inland rivers and waterways in China in 1944 and 1945, when
the Japanese launched their tremendous offensives across China. The B-25s,
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alone or in pairs, attacked river craft with demolition, fragmentation, and
incendiary bombs or strafed them with machine guns.5
The Japanese offensive prevented the Fourteenth Air Force from
destroying its east and south China airfields at Hengyang, Lingling, Kweilin,
Liuchow, and Nanking. In defense, the B-25s bombed and strafed river traffic,
troop concentrations, airfields, railroads, bridges, and industrial centers. This
activity was, however, unsuccessful. By the end of 1944, the Japanese had
connected with French Indo-China, and the Allies were forced to face the
dismal fact that victories in Burma had been more than offset by the
resounding defeat in China.6
Chinese land forces achieved certain victories during the summer of
1945; nevertheless, the war against the Japanese was destined to be decided
outside the CBI theater of operations. The B-29s flying from the Mariana
Islands, in particular, played the most decisive role during the last months of
the war by dropping atomic blasts on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When the war
ended in August 1945, preparations were made to move the 341st Bomb Group
to the United States in September. On 1 November 1945, the 341st Bomb
Group arrived at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, and was inactivated on the
following day.

5 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
6 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.

72
Table 3
Summary of the History of the 341st Bomb Group
Activity

Who/What/Where

Constituted

—

Date
14 August 1942

Activated

Karachi, India

15 September 1942

Inactivated

Camp Kilmer, New Jersey

2 November 1945

Assignments

Tenth Air Force

15 September 1942

India Air Task Force

3 October 1942

Fourteenth Air Force

December 1943

New York Port of Embarkation
Stations

Camp Malir, Karachi, India

30 December 1942 - June 1943

Kurmitola, India

June 1943 - January 1944

Kunming, China

January - December 1944

Aboard C. H. Muir

Commanding
Officers

15 September - 30 December
1942

Chakulia, India

Yankai, China

-

1 - 2 November 1945

Camp Kilmer, New Jersey

December 1944 - September
1945
4 October - 1 November 1945
1 - 2 November 1945

Col. Torgils G. Wold
Lt. Col. James A. Philpott
Col. Morris F. Taber
Maj. Loren S. Nickels
Col. Joseph B. Wells
Col. Donald L. Clark
Col. James W. Newsome

Battle Honors

India-Burma
China Defensive
China Offensive

Distinguished
Unit Citations

For Action over French Indo-China

11 December 1944 - 12 March
1945
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69th Composite Wing
The 69th Composite Wing was constituted as the 69th Bombardment
Wing on 9 August 1943, activated in China on 3 September 1943, assigned to
the Fourteenth Air Force, and redesignated the 69th Composite Wing in
December 1943. The Wing served in combat from December 1943 until
August 1945, was then assigned to the Tenth Air Force in August 1945, and
engaged in transport operations after Victory in Japan (V-J) Day. The Wing
was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation (DUC) for the period 1 -30
September 1945, when the wing ferried troops and supplies in China, helped to
evacuate prisoners of war, and flew many mercy and other special missions to
areas in China, French Indo-China, and Manchuria. The Wing was inactivated
in China on 26 December 1945.
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Table 4
Summary of the History of the 69th Composite Wing
Activity

Who/What/Where

Constituted

Date
9 August 1943

—

Activated

China

3 September 1943

Inactivated

China

26 December 1945

Groups

51st Fighter

1943 - 1945

341st Bomb Group

1943 - 1945

Stations

Commanding
Officers

Campaigns

Kunming, China

3 September 1943

Tsuyung, China

12 January 1944

Kunming, China

April 1944 - December 26,
1945

Brig. Gen. John C. Kennedy

23 December 1943

Col. Charles H. Anderson

1 September 1945

Maj. James F. Rhodes

15 November 1945

India-Burma
China Defensive
China Offensive

Distinguished
Unit Citations

China, French Indo-China, Manchuria

1 - 30 September 1945

Fourteenth Air Force, The Flying Tigers
Background
A gradual build-up of air strength occurred in the CBI Theater even
before the creation of the Fourteenth Air Force. The American Volunteer
Group (AVG), an organization of American volunteer fighters, had gone to
China during the summer of 1941 to defend the Burma Road, China’s last
remaining avenue of communication with the outside world. The AVG was
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discontinued in July 1942 and replaced by the China Air Task Force (CATF) of
the Tenth Air Force, which absorbed many people and most of the resources of
the AVG. This task force relied heavily upon the 23rd Fighter Group and the
11th Bombardment Squadron (M) for its hit-and-run guerilla war against the
Japanese. The insignia of the Fourteenth Air Force and its history as well as
the chit worn on the jackets of the Flying Tigers who flew combat are located in
Appendix J.

The Arrival of the Fourteenth Air Force
When expansion of the small CATF became possible in the spring of
1943, the Fourteenth Air Force was activated at Kunming, China, absorbing all
CATF resources. The 308th Bombardment Group (H), equipped with B-24s,
moved to China and joined the 23rd Fighter Group which had three squadrons
of its own and another in attached status, all flying P-40s; Flight A of the 9th
Photographic Squadron (L) equipped with P-43s; and the 11th Bombardment
Squadron (flying B-25s). From this meager organizational base, the Fourteenth
Air Force expanded during the remainder of 1943 and 1944, carrying the war
more directly to the Japanese as supplies permitted, since the air units
depended entirely upon an aerial supply line from India for all of their material
resources.7

7 Ibid., 14th 1942-1945 Files.

The 402nd Bombardment Group (M) and the 476th Fighter Group
became part of the Fourteenth on 19 May 1943, but neither group had any
squadrons, so neither became operational. As a result, both were inactivated
on 31 July 1943. Instead, the 51st Fighter Group moved to China in October
1943, with three squadrons of P-40s and one P-38 squadron under its control.
That same month, some of the fighter squadrons of the Chinese American
Composite Wing (CACW) (Provisional), which formed and trained in India,
arrived with P-40 and B-25 aircraft. Two wings, the 68th Fighter and 69th
Bombardment, had been activated on 3 September and 23 December 1943,
respectively. These wings, now redesignated as Composite wings, became
operational. The 68th Wing took control of the 23d Fighter Group, 11th
Bombardment Squadron, and bomber and fighter elements of the CACW,
while the 69th Wing assumed control of the 51st Fighter Group and, when it
arrived in China in January 1944, of the 341st Bombardment Group (M),
whose squadrons flew B-25s.
Completing the Fourteenth Air Force, the 33rd Fighter Group arrived in
China with P-38, P-40, and P-47 aircraft during March - April 1944 and joined
the new 312th Fighter Wing. In May 1944, the 81st Fighter Group arrived with
P-38, P-39 and P-40 aircraft, also joining the 312th Wing. In August 1944, the
311th Fighter Group arrived with A-36 and P-51 aircraft, joining the 312th
Wing, and in August and September, the 33rd Fighter Group returned to India.
Meanwhile, the CACW’S 1st Bombardment Group (M) (Provisional) and 3rd
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and 5th Fighter Groups (Provisional) had continued sending squadrons to
China, and all were engaged in combat with the arrival of the last CACW
squadron, the 3rd Bombardment, in September. Still other combat units
including liaison, photo reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance, troop carrier,
combat cargo, and night fighter squadrons arrived piecemeal to augment the
combat capability of the Fourteenth Air Force. Some of these units were
assigned directly to the Fourteenth, while others were placed under the various
wings or groups for control.
Once the Fourteenth was formed and free of Tenth Air Force control,
Brigadier General Chennault initiated a long-range plan which required the
establishment of staggered arcs of air bases, each probing farther into
enemy-held eastern China. The first arc was made up of a string of bases
running in a northeast - southwest line starting with Hengyang, followed by
Lingling, Kweilin, Liuchow, and Nanking. Kweilin served as the hub from
which all plans originated.
In time, Chennault further expanded his original line of forward air
bases and established a more probing line from Tanchuk through Namyung,
Suicheng, Kanchow, Suichwan, and Kian. This second line of attack would put
his bombers within easy reach of the lush shipping targets off the east coast of
China. Even beyond this line, Chennault proposed to operate his air force
from advance bases at Nanchang, Kienow, and Changting, from which Japanese
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targets as far north as Manchuria and as far east as the Japanese islands could
be hit.
As the Fourteenth gained strength, it threw its weight into two savage
air campaigns to deter enemy drives from the Hankow sector on the Yangtze
River. After the enemy withdrew, the Fourteenth consolidated its position and
launched the CACW with American and Chinese crews flying together, built
additional bases in eastern China, and struck at enemy-held ports on China’s
east coast and at the enemy’s coastal shipping lines. On 1 May 1943, the
forward echelon of the Fourteenth Air Force moved into eastern China along
the Hengyang-Kweilin line. This brought American planes well within range of
all major Japanese-controlled bases from northern China to French IndoChina and Thailand. At the same time, this tactic made Japanese shipping in
the China Sea doubly vulnerable to air attacks. Also in May, B-24s of the
308th Group delivered a severe blow to enemy shipping when they began
sowing mines in the Yangtze River and the harbors of Canton, Hong Kong,
Haiphong, Hankow, Shanghai, and Kakao on the island of Formosa. In
September 1943, the Fourteenth began skip-bombing Japanese cargo vessels in
the South China Sea and the Formosa Strait. By the end of 1943, such
low-level attacks had sunk 125,000 tons of shipping in that area.
During the last three months of 1943, the full power of the Fourteenth
Air Force was engaged against some 60,000 Japanese troops who carried on an
offensive in the area of Changteh and Changsha. Coupled with stubborn
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resistance of Chinese ground forces, the Fourteenth succeeded in driving the
enemy back to Yangtze River bases with a loss to the Japanese of about 20,000
troops. Also, from 25 November to 6 December, combined attacks by the
Fourteenth and Tenth Air Forces and the Royal Air Force were made against
Rangoon, Burma, aimed at neutralizing that important enemy-held port and its
rail facilities which the Japanese needed to oppose General Stilwell’s ChineseAmerican Task Force invasion of northern Burma from Ledo.
By early 1944, the Japanese controlled three strategic positions: the
bend of the Yellow River, the bulge of the Yangtze River, and the Hong
Kong-Canton area. During February and March, the enemy set in motion a
program of supply accumulation and troop reinforcement in these three base
areas in preparation for a major campaign in eastern China. The major
offensive began in April 1944, with the Fourteenth Air Force opposed by a
numerically superior Japanese Air Force operating from large, fully supplied,
and powerfully supported bases.
From about 22 June 1944 to 30 January 1945, the Fourteenth suffered
numerous set-backs as the enemy captured base after base. Falling to the
enemy were bases at Kengyang, Ungling, Kweilin, Luichow, Paoching, Tanchuk,
Nanking, Tushan, Suichwan, Namyung, Sincheng, Nankang, and Kanchow. In
fact, it was only the tactical support furnished by the Fourteenth that prevented
the total collapse of the semi-trained Chinese armies. Pilots of the Fourteenth
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fought bravely, establishing a combat ratio of 7.7 enemy aircraft destroyed for
every American plane lost.
One outstanding achievement of the Fourteenth Air Force during these
crucial months began in the spring of 1944 occurred when a handful of
specially equipped B-24 Liberators began all-out attacks against Japanese
shipping in the Formosa Strait and the South China Sea. Each B-24 averaged
about 800 tons of shipping sunk per combat sortie. This attrition placed a
tremendous burden on the Japanese lines of supply to the Southwest Pacific
and on Japan’s dwindling merchant fleet as a whole. During 1944, the total
claims of the Fourteenth Air Force against Japanese shipping were 640,900
tons sunk, 237,050 tons probably sunk, and 396,950 tons damaged. At the same
time, in aerial combat, American pilots destroyed 494 enemy planes, while
losing only 64. The enemy also lost 33,450 troops that year.8
January 1945 was the last month during which the Fourteenth was
opposed by large numbers of enemy aircraft, and they were able to destroy 211
enemy planes that month. After January, only 98 enemy planes could be
claimed as destroyed; none after June 1945. This attainment of air superiority
was assisted in some sense by the opening of the Stilwell Road into China in
January and the completion of a pipeline to Kunming, although most supplies
still had to be ferried across the Hump from India.

8 Ibid., 14th 1942-1945 Files.
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By spring 1945, the South China Sea and Indo-China coasts came within
economical range of newly established bases in the Philippines, and the Fifth
and Seventh Air Forces began attacking targets there. This made it possible
for the Fourteenth to concentrate increasingly on inland targets of importance,
especially on the Japanese communications corridor in China which ran north
and south between Hankow and Hengyang. At the same time, the Fourteenth
also continued its support of Chinese ground forces, particularly during the
Japanese drives of March 1945 toward Hsian and Ankang and later toward
Chihkiang. The Americans relentlessly attacked Japanese troops and positions
which prevented them from capitalizing on their ground superiority. By the
time the enemy surrendered their Greater East Asia corridor and withdrew
from southern China in May 1945, they found their mobility and supply lines
critically reduced by the attacks of the Fourteenth Air Force.9
Effective 22 June 1945, the XIV Air Force Tactical Air Command
(Provisional) was formed, controlling the 68th and 69th Composite Wings. On
9 July, the XIV Air Force Strategic Air Command (Provisional) was formed to
control the 312th Fighter Wing and Chinese American Composite Wing.
Meanwhile, the Tenth Air Force completed its combat operations in India and
Burma and on 23 July and moved to Kunming. One week later, the
Fourteenth moved from Kunming to Peishiyi. On 1 August 1945, the Tenth

9 Ibid., 14th 1942-1945 Files.
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Air Force assumed operational control over XIV Air Force Tactical Air
Command and the 68th and 69th Composite Wings, while Fourteenth used the
XIV Air Force Strategic Air Command for its portion of China. These
arrangements were short-lived, however, for the Japanese soon surrendered.
On 25 August, some organizational reshuffling took place, and the Fourteenth
again acquired most of the combat units which had temporarily been allocated
to the Tenth Air Force.
From 25 August to the end of 1945, both the Tenth and Fourteenth Air
Forces remained in China. They disposed of their subsidiary organizations
through inactivation or by returning the units to the United States for disposal.
The headquarters along with a number of organizations comprising the
Fourteenth left China in December 1945 and were transported to Fort Lawton,
Washington, where they were inactivated during the early weeks of 1946.10

May 1945
Germany unconditionally surrendered on V-E Day (Victory in Europe),
May 8, 1945. Preliminary announcement among the Flying Tigers stole some
thunder from the official announcement; nevertheless, the Chinese Nectar of
the Gods flowed freely and even the heavenly aroma of stateside rye or
bourbon came from an occasional bottle hoarded for the celebration. The next

10 Ibid., 14th 1942-1945 Files.
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day was sobering, however, when they flew their first mission of the month, a
gentle reminder that the war in China was not over.
The squadron was even more severely jolted into reality the next day
when fifteen of their planes took part in a coordinated attack with three
squadrons of the 341st Bomb Group. The target was Paoching, China, a
principal Japanese supply point in Hunan Province. Immediately after
dropping its bombs, Plane 421 sustained a direct hit somewhere near the cock
pit and top turret which were in flames. The plane never recovered from a
sudden 45-degree dive, and it crashed and exploded on the west side of the Tzu
Kiang River directly across from the town. The Battle of China was not yet
over.
At the end of the month, a sudden burst of activity was highlighted by a
successful night mission in which twelve planes played havoc with Japanese
transportation facilities in French Indo-China. This was the Squadron’s first
all-night mission in about a year, and happily, all planes and their crews
returned safely. The Squadron was just beginning to breathe more easily when
two crews were briefed to follow-up the all-night mission. The first plane
experienced difficulty retracting its landing gears immediately after take-off
because of a break in the hydraulic system. Eventually, it landed safely.
Because the first plane could not continue, three efforts were made from the
tower to call Lieutenant Wirth, who commanded the second plane, back to the
field. Apparently he did not receive the messages, and the plane was not seen
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or heard from again, though all airfields and fighter control stations were
carefully checked. The personnel on board were reported Missing in Action.

June 1945
After nearly two years, the Squadron learned through his letter to them
that T/Sgt. John W. Boyd was alive. In August 1943, when the 22nd was based
at Chakulia, India, his plane had been shot down while making a low level
attack on Meiktila Dam. Only Sergeant Boyd and the engineer-gunner, S/Sgt
John E. Leisure, were able to leave the plane quickly. Because their chutes did
not open until they had almost reached the ground, they were severely injured.
As a result, they were captured by the Japanese and imprisoned at Rangoon.
Leisure died of malnutrition; Boyd, on the other hand, survived the liberation
of Rangoon and was freed.
On 3 June, all sixteen of the B-25s took part in an attack by the entire
341st Bomb Group on Liuchow (24°18’N-109°16’E) in support of the Chinese
offensive on the city. The Squadron planes staged out of Luliang, China, in
three flights. Major Berryman led Flight A; Lieutenant Eck, Flight B; Captain
Kroeger, Flight C, with Lieutenant Schofield as the other pilot. The planes
made a successful rendezvous with ten fighters from the 23rd Fighter Group
made up of P-51s and P-38s over Ishan at 1325 hours at 10,000 feet. A and B
Flights were over the target at 1338 Hours; C Flight, 1353 hours. The entire
bomb load of the planes, 161 N -l and A -l demos, 18 M-17 incendiaries, and 24

85
M-18 incendiaries (M-18), were dropped precisely onto the target area assigned
on the south and east side of the river in Liuchow. At least two secondary
explosions were observed and several fires, resembling oil or gasoline fires,
swelled with black smoke. The combination of smoke and clouds obscured
accurate assessment of the number of buildings destroyed.

Major F. M. Sibley
During June, the executive officer who embodied the 22nd, Major F. M.
Sibley, ended his tour of duty. The squadron had been led by five commanding
officers, and the personnel had so changed that only Major Sibley and three
other men recalled the squadron’s India activities. The major had been
commissioned a first lieutenant on 22 June 1942, and served in an
administrative capacity for three months at Santa Ana Army Air Base.
Typically, Sib wanted no more of that stuff and left the United States for
overseas at his own request on 7 October 1942. On 1 December 1942, he was
assigned to the 22nd Bomb Squadron in Karachi, India, as Mess Officer and
Adjutant. On 22 September 1943, having been promoted to Captain fourteen
days before, Sibley was transferred to the 341st Bomb Group as the Adjutant.
In the middle of November, he returned to the 22nd to begin the eighteen
more months of uninterrupted service to the squadron which ended with his
rotation to the United States in June 1945. During his period at the 22nd, he
was Assistant S-2 Officer, S-2 Officer for six months, and Executive Officer
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beginning 1 July 1944. He became a major on 1 October 1944, after earning
five overseas bars, the Asiatic-Pacific ribbon, and two bronze stars for the
India-Burma and China campaigns. (Refer to Appendix K for the Foreword to
the History of 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers)

CHAPTER 5

A COMPARISON OF THE MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP
OF THE FLYING TIGERS AND EDUCATION

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study, Flying Tigers' 22nd Bomb Squadron 1942 1945: A n Analysis o f Management and Leadership Practices, was to examine a
series of phenomena related to both military leadership and educational
administration. This investigation looked at the interrelationships, definitions,
and applications of war, education, administration, leadership, and power.
This study is unique because of the background of the investigator. This
researcher, who later became an educator, was a fighter-bomber pilot as a
member of the Flying Tigers. Consequently, the methodology used included
historical, observational, and retrospective components. Historical research
encompassed all available documents pertaining to the Flying Tigers as well as
first-hand accounts from surviving members of the squadron. The
observational aspects of the research were ex post facto in nature, an advantage
in this case because the investigator had no impact on the behavior of the
participants. Effectively, then, this is a case study of the Flying Tigers including
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their development, their activities during World War II, and their
organizational behavior. Information gained from the research was then
applied to the experience of the researcher, an educator with nearly fifty years
of experience.
Drawing on observations and historical investigation, the following
research questions were posed:
1. How did The Flying Tigers come to be?
2. What was the importance of The Flying Tigers to the success of the
United States in World War II?
3. What was the administrative and leadership mode of The Flying
Tigers'!
a. Was the mode appropriate for the military?
b. Was the mode appropriate for the time?
4. How does wartime combat compare to the educational environment
today?
5. How does the administrative and leadership mode of The Flying
Tigers apply to today’s educational scene?
This chapter addresses the last question about the application of the research
to the current educational environment.
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The Application of This Research to Current Education
In considering the twenty-first century, futurists John Naisbitt and
Patricia Aburdene remarked, "The dominant principle of organization has
shifted, from management in order to control an enterprise to leadership in
order to bring out the best in people and to respond quickly to change."1
Leadership in any environment differs from management or administration in
that it is neither coercive nor necessarily hierarchical. Current school
administration has, as one of its primary current goals, justification of the entire
enterprise called public education. Therefore, the typical concentration of
administrators is constantly political and economic rather than educational.
Successful and effective leadership are not the same. For example,
every task-oriented group basically needs to achieve its goals and to maintain
itself. If these two goals are accomplished, then leadership has been successful.
Further, if no cost of that success has impeded reaching the group’s goal, then
the leadership has also been effective. According to Owens,
When one attempts to lead and the intended behaviors are in fact
elicited from members of the group, we speak of successful leadership.
However, although successful leadership may produce the intended
behaviors in the group, it does not necessarily follow that they actually
help the group either to achieve its tasks or to strengthen itself as a
group. One could, for example, try to improve the effectiveness of a
group by emphasizing orderly standard operating procedures. A leader
who was able to get these procedures developed and installed so that

1 John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2000: Ten New
Directions for the 1990’s (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.,
1990), 218.
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people implemented them could be described as successful. If, however,
the processes of establishing the new procedures produced a great deal
of dissatisfaction among members of the group and-in the end-the
organization did not seem to be any more effective in achieving its
goals, then the leadership could hardly be termed effective.2
In a school, for example, a principal may try to initiate a new program and do
so successfully. If, however, the teachers and students become rebellious and
uncooperative as a result, then the leadership has not been effective.
While leadership may not be a hierarchical activity, the maximum
capacity must be obtained from every individual without precipitating
disorganization. After acceptance of goals by the entire group, it is critical to
engage the creativity of all those involved in solving the problem. This applies
in both educational and military environments. For example, every member of
the Flying Tigers was engaged in site-based management whenever engaged in a
mission. With certain guidelines and operational procedures as standard, the
pilot as leader and the crew were totally responsible for the success or failure
of the mission. The more urgent the problem, the more important for the
group leader to encourage, support, affirm, and reward risk-taking behavior.
During World War II, the upper management in the military had limited
understanding of air power and air combat. As a result, lower level leaders
lacked a resource for advice and consultation. At the same time, the power
structure had problems of defending budget, obtaining supplies, and explaining

2 Owens, p. 158.
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circumstances they faced in Asia. Theoretical models had not been established
for the situations that pertained; therefore, the on-site staff were stuck in
irrelevant theory that did not apply to war combat.
The creation of community is important in both military and educational
environments especially in situations where objectives are complex. Arguably,
the objective in the CBI Theater in World War II was simple: destroy the
Japanese and prevent them from conquering China, Burma, and India. In
reality, the task, as has already been demonstrated, was much more
complicated. For example, traversing the Hump required a specific maneuver
in order to transport supplies from India to China. A new tactic, in another
case, had to be developed to blow up bridges. Leaders encouraged and
supported their group members in risk-taking; therefore, they did not hesitate
to try new ideas for fighting the Japanese. Variation can turn into
achievement.
Bonds are formed when groups have deprivation in common. During
World War II, a common economy developed among troops in the CBI
Theater. Despite life-threatening challenges, the mission of victory could not
be compromised. This goal presses individuals to find in themselves strengths
and resources that might otherwise go untapped. This is the essential challenge
of leadership.
Organization, especially in 1943, was an issue for the Flying Tigers.
Although they did not know of or relate to the administrative and leadership
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concerns of the upper echelons, squadron members remained committed on a
daily basis to their objectives. They did not require external direction because
their strategic objective was clear. The leadership demonstrated within the
341st Bomb Group and 22nd Bomb Squadron exhibited, as Warren Bennis has
found, management of attention, management of meaning, and management of
trust, for the squadron members clearly understood the goal and trusted their
leaders.3

Implications of the Research
Leadership
Military officers and educational administrators are often placed in
situations which require instantaneous decision-making. The quality of these
decisions determines their later characterization as either a manager, an
administrator, a bureaucrat, or a leader. For example, in the CBI Theater,
Captain Williams and his crew left on a mission, but their engine was hit by
anti-aircraft fire and began to smoke. Unable to continue the mission while
debilitated, Captain Williams decided to return to base. While circling, he
learned that several other fighters were low on fuel and needed to land
immediately. He decided to wait as long as he could to let those fighters land.
While in queue, his wing started to flame, and he gave the order to bail out,
which the men did. As a result of this decision, all but one of the men

3 Ibid.

93
survived. In fact, the only crew member killed lost his life because he had not
followed the instruction to keep his parachute with him at all times. In
summary, Captain Williams’ decision to let the other fighters land first enabled
all their crews and his own to survive. Consequently, he demonstrated
leadership rather than simply command.
This exemplifies situational leadership in which the power of the
leader’s position combines with the degree of structure of the task and the
quality of the relations between the leaders and the followers.4 Captain
Williams demonstrated a style of leadership which was appropriate to the
situation at a time when he might otherwise have exhibited one of McCall and
Lombardo’s fatal flaws-he may have been both unable to think strategically
and incapable of acting sensitively to the needs of the other planes.5 He
demonstrated all three skill areas required for effective leadership in given
situations: situation sensitivity, situational management, and style flexibility.6

Administration vs. Leadership
Differences exist, however, between leadership and administration.
While both require decision-making, administration more than leadership is
concerned with the issue of control. This is evident in schools in the form of

4 Owens, 162.
5 Hersey and Blanchard, 99.
6 Owens, 180.
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crowd control and avoidance of litigation. For example, before a recent local
high school graduation, the principal warned the students that throwing of
mortarboards was unacceptable because of potential injury. Any student, he
said, observed tossing his or her hat in the air, regardless of the amount of
exuberance, would forfeit his or her diploma. In their excitement, several
students launched their hats and lost their diplomas as punishment. This
exemplifies administration, not leadership.
Sometimes a fine line can be drawn between administration and
leadership. An administrator is defined by role and power; a leader is " . . . a
member of the group who helps it to develop ways of interacting that facilitate
achieving the goals that the individuals share."7 Both, however, are goaloriented. As a case in point, a teacher may be a leader but is not, by
definition, an administrator. The situation may determine the leadership of the
group.
According to Hersey and Blanchard, leadership is "the process of
influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts toward goal
achievement in a given situation."8 However,
Situational theory uses only one variable to analyze the nature of the
situation-maturity. Maturity is the capacity to set high but attainable
goals, the willingness and ability to take responsibility, and the
experience of an individual or group. However, maturity is a relative

7 Owens, 148.
8 Hersey and Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior. 94.
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concept. An individual or group is not mature or immature in any
general sense. Rather, maturity is defined only in relation to a specific
task. The question is not Is the individual or group mature or
immature? but rather On this specific job or task, what is the level of
maturity of the group or individual? . . . . The maturity of both
individuals and the work group determines the appropriate supervisory
or leader behavior.9
The investigator has observed great change over time in the maturity of the
school district in which he works. The goal, historically, was simple and
attainable-educate students by teaching them the skills and knowledge needed
to function successfully in society. As the district has grown from small-town to
large metropolitan area, however, the organizational behavior has changed.
This transition is exhibited particularly by the unwillingness of most teachers
and administrators to accept responsibility for the actions of this unwieldy
monolith. The situation of the organization has changed; leadership has not.
In a school district, administration takes the form of an administrative
code an d/o r manuals on policy and procedure. During World War II,
administration of the Flying Tigers was determined by air doctrine, especially as
defined by AWPD/1, the primary document concerning the fighting of an air
war by the United States. As the war ensued, refinements could be observed
as each squadron interpreted, not the overall mission of defeating the enemy,
but the procedures required to accomplish this goal. Therefore, strategies

9 Wayne K. Hoy and Patrick B. Forsyth. Effective Supervision: Theory
into Practice (New York: Random House, 1986), 135-136.
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included coastal attacks, raids on ports or harbor installations, and visual
sweeps up and down coastal waters.
In education, however, the aim is defined as educating students, but the
strategy to attain that goal may not be as direct as dropping a bomb on the
enemy. It is nearly impossible, for example, to educate a hungry child or to
force a student who has witnessed the murder of her mother by her stepfather
to pay attention to the details of a textbook. Can a student high on drugs
concentrate at all?
Teachers who remain idealistic and committed to the goal of educating
students are frustated, but not daunted by these problems. This researcher has
witnessed the success of teachers who have become leaders in extremely
difficult or hazardous situations in their schools. For example, in a vocationaltechnical high school where this investigator has taught, the emphasis is on job
skills training so that students earn both a high school diploma and a useful
career upon graduation. The environment is, in and of itself, highly motivating
for students because the means and the end are closely related. As a result,
one would expect that teachers would not have to work hard to motivate
students. This is not the case.
Students apparently decide the homework issue around eighth or ninth
grade. Until that time, most students actually turn in assignments. By tenth
grade, until last year the first grade available in the vocational-technical high
school in this district, many students simply refuse to do homework. The
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dilemma for the teacher is that work that could previously be assigned for
independent learning or review, especially reading, had to consume class time
in order for students to receive content. This investigator, as a teacher in the
vocational-technical high school which, incidentally, is not the only place with
the homework crisis, resolved to circumvent this problem by doing all content
in class in a variety of ways. For example, all reading was done aloud for
history so that, at a minimum, every student had the opportunity to hear the
content. After that, students worked in groups on answering questions and
then the entire class participated in a discussion on the topic. Finally, an openbook test was given which could be answered with help from classmates. In
other words, every student had a chance to be exposed to the information.
This exemplifies leadership in transferring content knowledge.

Implications for Future Research
The study of history can guide the future. Synthesizing the experience
of life may also provide direction. The unique feature in this research,
however, was the use of two diverse situations which are related only by the
fact that the investigator was present in both.
It is almost idiotic to comment that the world is changing. Technology,
for example, has enabled people to communicate globally instantaneously. In
education, however, schools still operate in a mass production mentality.
Connection is not frequently made between real-world and academics. This

98
problem could be mitigated by conceptual blockbusting-examining two or more
seemingly unrelated events with the goal of solving problems in one of them.

Conclusion
There is a radical-and wonderful-new idea in the air these days
in at least some of our public conversations: the idea that every
citizen is capable of the kind of intellectual competence
previously attained by only a small minority of citizens.. . . the
notion that all children could and should be inventors of their
own theories, critics of other people’s ideas, makers of their own
personal marks on the world. It’s an idea with revolutionary
implications. If we take it seriously.10
Schools today are a battlefield not terribly unlike the CBI Theater.
Legislation, regulation, and fear of litigation have constrained many
administrators who eagerly try to educate children. Teachers employed in
schools, like pilots and other Air Force personnel, must be taught to do their
jobs effectively. Similar to conditions during World War II in Asia, schools
must do their jobs and attain their goals without supplies, adequate resources,
or trained leadership. Further, models of leadership must come from within
education rather than attempting to replicate models from business or the
military.11

10 Deborah Meier. "Democracy Is Not Always Convenient." Education
Week. 19 April 1995, 35.
11 Thomas J. Sergiovanni. "Schools Are Special Places," Education Week.
10 May 1995, 48-49, 35.
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The militaiy during World War II brought about change in the process
of leadership development particularly during the induction phase. It was not
an accident that future members of the 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers,
were molded into an effective combat team. According to Hersey and
Blanchard, all four of Schein’s elements of training are present in military
leadership training:
•

the physical removal of the individuals being changed from the
accustomed routines, sources of information, and social relationships;

•

the undermining and destruction of all social supports;

•

demeaning and humiliating experience to help individuals being
changed to see their old attitudes or behavior as unworthy and thus
to be motivated to change;

•

the consistent linking of reward with willingness to change and of
punishment with unwillingness to change.12

This was significant for the 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers, because
training included being sent far from home, being removed from contact with
their relatives and friends, being subjected to subhuman treatment to become
officers and gentlemen, and often being threatened to be forced to complete
harsh duties or to lose free time. The ultimate penalty was loss of status as a
candidate for officer status.
After successful completion of training, the future leaders quickly moved
to the changing phase, first by identifying with the Drill Instructor (DI), and

12 Hersey and Blanchard, 382.
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then by emulating informal leaders as the cadets developed into officers. The
five percent who proved to be too slow, too fat, too dumb, or too difficult were
dropped. The remaining cadets emerged with one passionate desire--to persist
as cadets at all costs.13 Because of the exigency of the war waged against the
principle of freedom, Americans allowed themselves to be subjected to this
type of education and training. Each cadet who completed training emerged as
a leader dedicated to the defense of freedom and the defeat of the enemy.
In 1995, the same type of will to win against the enemies of society and
to emerge victorious currently challenges all Americans. Especially hard hit,
educational leaders in the United States are faced daily with illegal drugs,
raging violence, brutal crime, hopeless desolation for many of the students who
live on the streets, abject poverty, and a host of other social problems.
American schools have become battle zones for gangs, rapes, extortion,
immorality, muggings, weapons, and lethal substances. Relatively unheard of in
the past, students, teachers, and administrators are beaten, battered, and even
shot to death on a regular basis. Most recently, the most heinous threat
concocted by American citizens who were educated in United States schools
resulted in the fatal destruction of a government building in Oklahoma City,
where nearly 200 people were murdered.

13 Ibid., 388.
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Education is a tool. It can be used to train leaders for war or peace.
Schools must, as the military did in World War II, continue to be responsive to
the situation which currently exists in the schools. We are at war. We need to
prepare and train combatants in the skills, techniques, and art of leadership as
the militaiy did in 1942-1945, as we educated future leaders of the 22nd Bomb
Squadron, the Flying Tigers.

APPENDIX A
PHOTOCOPIES OF AIRPLANES IN COMBAT
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IN WORLD WAR II
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
CBI Hump Pilots Association, Inc,
P. 0. Box 458
Poplar Bluff, Missouri 63902
(314) 785-2420

For Local Media

NAME

JACK' SCHOFIELD________________________

ADDRESS l?OB South 8th S t r e e t,

YOURPHONE(702)582-9638______

Las Vegas, Nevada 89104_____

COMMENTS; B-2^ M itch ell P i l o t , 22nd Bomb Squadron, ? 4 ls t Bomb Group, 69th Composite
Wing, 14th Air Force "Flying Tigers," China-Burma-India (OBI) Theaterf_A si& tic^ P acific------Combat Theater, United S ta te s Ancv Air Pnr<»Bf i Q4P..1 oitq, World War I I _______ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

. . . . w a s awarded the Chinese Air Force
Pilot
Wings authorized by
General Tang Fei of the Chinese Air Force, Republic of China (Taiwan), with the coopera
tion of the Chinese Air Force Veterans Association.
Presentations were made by
Major General Wang Kwang-Ying, on September 1, 1994, during the Hump P ilo ts Association's
49th Annual Reunion in Sacramento, California.
Colonel Konsin Shah, President of the Chinese Air Force Veterans Association stated
t h a t the Government of the Republic of China i s honoring these individuals. "While China
was encircled from the c o a s t , Hump Pilots missions were the only resource t h a t could carry
the war outward. In the 49th year of Japanese surrender, I wish to congratulate members
of your Association f o r a smooth and graceful reunion. We will always remember your
•fforts in 1943-1945, through our generation into the next generation. Without the Hump
Lkits the Chinese Air Force and 14th Air Force could not have fought the war against the
Japanese."
The Hump Pilots Association is composed of over 5,000 a i r crew members and support
personnel who were engaged in the China-Burma-India Theater of operation during WW-II. A
major portion of the f l y in g provided the e n ti r e supplies fo r the American and Chinese
Armies arid Air Forces in China—the f i r s t time such a massive a i r l i f t was ever attempted.
The November 19, 1945 issue of TIME magazine reported on page 26: “Unofficial estimates
were t h a t 3,000 Allied t ran s p o rt and t a c t i c a l a i r c r a f t had been lost among those jagged
peaks (Himalaya Mountains). But for t h is price, the U. S. had backed China, and U.S.
units in China, with invaluable aid: 78,000 tons went over the Hump in the peak month of
July." These downed a i r c r a f t made an "aluminum t r a i l " over the "Hump," as the Himalayas
were c alle d. The t e r r i b l e weather and rugged t erra in posed as constant a danger as the
Japanese fighte rs and bombers.
A three-volume s e t of books, CHINA AIRLIFT - THE HUMP records a f i r s t hand "history"
of the CBI Theater during WW-II and are available through the Association. HPA erected a
Memorial to those who flew the "Hump" which is located at the Air Force Museum, WrightPatterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. The Museum of Aviation, Warner-Robins Air Force
•Base, Warner-Robins, Georgia, houses an extensive exhibit of the China Burma India
Theater, and displays f o r f u t u r e generations what was accomplished by these veterans.
Receiving these wings will long be remembered, and is evidence t h a t the successful
e f f o r t s to keep an e n t i r e nation alive under the gr eatest of odds, enabling us to achieve
victory, has not been forgotte n!
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Since 1941 an ever growing number of Ameriain men—long
isolated from the w orld except by air—have braved fearful
weather, uncharted terrain, and an enemy superior in numbers
to help smash Japanese dreams of conquest. As members of
the original Flying Tigers, or the tiny China A ir Task Force,
or now the famed 14th A ir Force they have all been com
manded by a man o f indomitable spirit and determination—
General G L. Chennault.

KUNMING, CHINA
HEADQUARTERS

14th AIR FORCE
FLYING TIGERS”

C. L. CHENNAULT, COMMANDING GENERAL

APPENDIX G
INSIGNIA OF THE BOMBING BULLDOGS
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22nd Bom bardm ent Squadron
3 4 1 st Bom bardm ent Group (M)
14th Air Force
China
1945

"THE BOMBING BULLDOG"

Official Insignia of the
22nd Bombardment Sqdn. (M)
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AAF 421 (22d Bomb* Sqdn.)

19 March 1945*

SUBJECTS A ircra ft Marking fo r the 22d Bombardment Squadron (U).
/

70s

Commanding O fficer, 341st Bombardment Group (M), A.7 .0 . 212,
c /o P ostraster, New Xork C ity.

By au th ority .delegated to the Conaanding General, ArayAir
. Forces, by AG le t t e r 400.161 (12-7-42) OB-S-A, dated 19 Bacasfcor 1942,
the follow ing in sig n ia for the narking of a ir c r a ft of. t£e 22d Bernhard- .
. nent Squadron (!£), Army Air Forces, i s approveds
AIRCRAFT laRKXMOs Over and through a lemon yellow d is c ,
border lig h t brcrwn, a caricatured,
pugnacious, lig h t brown B-25 a ir c r a ft
in f lig h t , toward dexter base, wearing
a red brown derby and a red-and-whitestriped turtlenack sweater, having
look o f fe r o c ity on caricatured fa c e ,
machine gun b a rrels, proper, issu in g
from n o s tr ils, and a large brown dlger
fir e d , proper, w ith white band, held
in mouth, leaving white speed lin e s
and tr a ilin g smoke toward rear, proper,
as per record drawing.
The insignia w ill face toward the ffcont
o f the a ir c r a ft.
HISTORY:

The 22d Bombardment Squadron, B edim ,
was o rig in a lly organized as the 22d
Bombardment Squadron, <23, AF, which
was constituted and made activ e a t
Hamilton F ield , C alifornia, on
20 October 1939, pursuant to author
it y contained in AG 320.2 (9-28-39),
dated 20 October 1939; inactivated on
6 A pril 1942 per Radiogram, dated
6 A pril 1942; authorized to be a c ti
vated a t Columbia, South Carolina,
per AG 320.2 (4-16-42) KH-H-AF, dated
21 April 1942, activated 4 Hay 1942;
reorganized as the 22d Bombardment
Squadron (ttadiua), in accordance
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SubJ i A ircraft Marking fo r the 22d Bombardment Squadron (lfl
.HISTORY:
(C ont'd.)

(Cont5d .)

vdth f /0 1-127, dated 1 Ju2y 1942, 08
15 Septeabar 1942; reorganised a s tb s
22d Bombardment Squadron, Medium, in
accordance w ith T/0 1-127, dated
18 August 1944.
The 23d Bombardment Squadron) Medina,
has no other h isto r y , and i t s b a ttle
honors have not been dotarsined.

For the ComrandiEg General, Arsgr Air Forces I

1 In d .
Drawing.

ROBERT Co JOSES,
Colonel, A ir Corps,
C hief, Personnel Services B iv isie a ,
O ffice, A sst. Chief o f Air S ta ff,
Personnel.
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B-B5
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H.

^xSTUCUISKPJJ CHIT CITATIONS

For action over French Jhdo-China,
11 iocenher 19Ut*»12 March 19lt5

WD GO 92, 191$

CITATION
The 3Iilst Bombardment Group (H) i s c ited £or outstanding p erfom aoa o f
doty in cation ag ain st the eneBy. Bofcwesn 11 Xteeeabor l$u li end 12 Haareh
2$h$, th is croup waged an extremely su ccessfu l and highly dangeroos
bridge-busting campaign along the land corridor then held by the Japanese
between north China and the tremendous raw m aterial p o ten tia l found ia
her conquests in southern Asia end adjacent islands* To thwart th e
Japanese plan to c a p ita lise on th is land lin e ; the group was aasi#j8d tho
hazardous task o f destroying the numerous s te e l and concrete bridges on
the modern r a il lin e s in French Jhdo-Chlna* Two primtey consideration*
faced the group in preparing i t s method of executing th is mission*
Supplies, g a so lin e, and bombs wore a t a premium in air-supplied China, and
the Japanese bed ringed the bridges with extensive a n tia ircra ft defenses*
To meet these considerations, the group developed and employed i t s n o
sty le o f attack , ng lip bombing,n which employed & tr ip le ehangjB in
bombing le v e l a t lo u altitu d e as an elu siv e maneuver over h eavily do*
fended, channeled approaches to the targets* This technique yield ed such
accuracy that the tonnage o f boohs expended per bridge destroyed reached
a new record low o f 7*75 tons per bridge. Despite hazardous conditions
of low v is ib ilit y , rugged terra in , and in ten se, accurate ant i air c r a ft
f ir e , unler which a large part o f these "glip hording" missions were run,
the group cectr-ved 21 major bridges end damaged 17 in 23 m issions.
P articularly representative o f tho determination and perseverance o f the
combat crews are the missions of 27 February and *> Marsh 19k$» A t o t a l
o f 10 h igh -p riority bridges were destroyed end 2 damaged under ensqy
f ir e , with the expenditure of 385 bomb tons per bridge* Because the
bridges wore generally located in gorges and v a lle y s, approach to tbs
targets was r e str ic te d to narrow lanes in which the enaqr could e a s ily
concentrate th e ir defensive fir e * Four of the group's Airplanes were
shot down in th ese attacks and 31 others were damaged. Twenty craw
Belabors wore k ills d and twelve were wounded* The coat was n ot lig h t to
the group, but the in terd iction o f th is overland route was iap arativo.
With extraordinary heroism, gallan try, determination, and e sp r it da
corps, the group s o t only met the dangerous challenge, but establish ed
a new record in econosy o f operations in doing so* These aehievesuaxte o f
the iMg*. ^nhgroEent Croup (H) are worthy o f the gallan t trad ition * o f
tho American m ilita ry service*

See B ibliographical Koue*

APPENDIX J
INSIGNIAS OF TH E FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE
AND THE FLYING TIGERS
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HISTORY CF INSIGNIA. CF FOQRTEEOTH AIR FORCE

The Fourteenth Air Force was constituted 5 March 1943 and mada
activ e 10 March 1943J i t is e n title d to b a ttle particip ation cred its
as follow s:
China Defensive and China O ffensive, GO 12, WD, 1 Feb 46
The Fourteenth' Air Force in sign ia was approved 6 August 1943, as
a r esu lt of a personal request for such approval and adaption from
General Chennault. The b asis for the design submitted lie s in the
organization of the Fourteenth Air Force from the A.T.G., commonly
known as the •’F lying Tigers".
The A.V.G. (F lying Tigers) was not a regu larly organized u n it of
the Army of the United S ta tes, therefore no o f f ic ia l connection could
e x is t between th is group and the Fourteenth Air Farce. However, upon
the organization of the Fourteenth Air Force, individual members o f
the group were eith er called to active duty under reserve commissions
or commissioned in the Army of the United S tates and assigned to duty
with the 23d F ighter Group, a u n it of the Fourteenth Air Farce. Other
individual members of the A.V.G. were undoubtedly assigned to other
u n its of th at force (General Chennault).
D escription o f I n sig n ia :

On a blue d isc 2-1/2 inches in diameter, a winged Bengal
tig e r golden orange with black and white markings, below and p a r tia lly
covering a white star 7/3 inches in diameter, charged with a 5/16 inch
red d isc.
S ig n ific a n c e o f I n s ig n ia :

The design of th is in sign ia is adapted from the insign ia
used by the A.V.G. (Flying Tigers) members of which now fora a part
of the Fourteenth Air Force.

USAF UNIT LINEAGE

C o n s titu te d F o u rte e n th A ir Force on 5 Mar 191:3.
WD L tr AG 320.2 (3-2-1*3) GR-I-AFDPU-K, 5 Mar 151:3.
A c tiv a te d on 10 Mar 191:3.
GO 10, He US Army F orces CUT, 10 Mar 1:3; GC 1, llu'iF, 1C Mar 1:3; AG Card and
AFHc Form 6-525, l h t h AF.
I n a c tiv a te d on 6 Jan 191:6.
WD L tr 322 ( 3 0 N ov U5) 0 5 -I-S F H 0 U -” , 5 Dec U5 amnd by AC- 322 ( 8 J u l U6)
A0-T-AFC0P. (Ili7e)-M , I I J u l U6; L t r , ASF, SSPE, 8 Jan 1:6; GO 1 , ASF, SEFE,
2 Jan 1:6.
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APPENDIX K
FOREWORD FROM TH E HISTORY OF TH E 22ND BOMB SQUADRON,
THE FLYING TIGERS
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Foreword
T h ere w ill be a day when our combat stories w ill have
lost their zest; when our w ild tales of heroism w ill have
been unrecognizably mangled even beyond their origi
nal half-truths; when our wife will be bored by the
millionth re-telling; when our friends w ill have
shamed us by fibbing more dramatically than we. In
short, there w ill be a day when we w ill be left aloneby the fireplace with our memories, our pipe and our
dog. Toward that day this book is dedicated.

—
—

— 1

Approved by
Commanding General
14th Air Force
Kunming, China
May 1945
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